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The Macondo Well Blowout: Taking the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Seriously
John J. Costonis1
© 2011
It is the foible of all judicatures to value their own justice
and pretend that there is none so exquisite as theirs….”2
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A. The Macondo Blowout as an Admiralty Tort
B. A Role for OCSLA’s Environmental and Public Lands
Perspective?
1. OCSLA’s Three Phases
2. The Fifth Circuit Model and the Macondo Scenario:
A Comparison
3. Rodrigue: Interpreting OCSLA and Anticipating Executive Jet
C. A Framework for Assessing OCSLA’s Role in the Macondo Blowout Litigation
II. OCSLA PHASE I: OCSLA ’53 to ’77
A. Threading the Needle: OCSLA Sec. 1333(2)
B. DOI Discretion in Managing the OCSLA Leasing Program
C. Law Selection and Law Application under OCSLA sections 1333(a)(1)
And 1333(a)(2)(A)
1. Sections 1333(a)(1) and (a)(2)(A): Of Substantive Law, Law
Selection and Law Application
2. Admiralty Law, Federal Non-Admiralty Law or State Law?
D. Rodrigue, the Supreme Court, and the Fifth Circuit
1. The Minimalist Level
2. The Mid-Level
3. The Executive Jet Level
E. Of Maxi-Gaps, Mini-Gaps, Section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s “other Federal
laws,” and Admiralty Law’s “Application of its own Force”
F. Scorecard: OCSLA Phase I (1953-1977)
Chancellor Emeritus and Judge Albert Tate and Rosemary Neal Hawkland
Professor of Law. My gratitude to colleagues Patrick Martin, John Devlin and Ed
Richards for commenting on the themes developed in this paper, to LSU Law Center
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III. OCSLA PHASE II: OCSLA ’78-’90
A. Overview of a “New Statutory Regime”
B. Section 1333(a)(1) and Title III
1. Of “Vessels” and “Offshore Facilities”
2. The Gusher Issue and OCSLA ‘78
3. The Fifth Circuit and Macondo Models under OCSLA ‘78
C. Scorecard: OCSLA Phase II
IV. OCSLA PHASE III: Post-OPA 1990
A. Deepwater Horizon: A “Vessel” post-OPA ’90?
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C. Scorecard: OCSLA Phase III
V. Conclusion
Addendum: B-1 Bundle Rulings

I. Introduction
The “saltier” a dispute, the greater the confidence with which admiralty
judges pronounce it appropriate for their attention. Was the discharge from the
Macondo well blowout3, only six ten-thousandths of which may have been salty,
salty enough to warrant the inclusion within admiralty jurisdiction of the economic
losses it generated. Or was it rather a pinch of salt in an oily stew?
The reference, of course, is to the well blowout and fire in April 20, 2010,
which discharged an estimated 700 barrels of oil from the Deepwater Horizon as
against some 4.9 million barrels from BP’s Macondo well4, a designated situs under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act5 (OCSLA). To some, a claim of sufficient
saltiness given these numbers might call to mind Justice Harlan’s plaint in a different
context that “whenever a maritime interest is involved, no matter how slight or
marginal, it must displace a local interest, no matter how pressing or significant.”6
Whatever its saltiness quotient, the blowout is first, foremost, and last an
environmental/pollution control event. In fact, it is the dreaded focus of at least
three federal environmental pollution control measures –OCSLA, the Oil
For a detailed account of the Macondo blowout, see National Commission on the
BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deepwater: The Gulf Oil
Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling (2011) [hereinafter President’s Report].
4 See id. at 130 (Deepwater Horizon discharge); id. at 167 (Macondo oil discharge).
5 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (1953), (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356(a)(2006) & Supp. III 2009)[hereinafter OCSLA].
6 Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 739 (1961).
3
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PollutionAct of 1990 (OPA)7, and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.8 One or
more of these statutes has engaged Congress since 1948. All have taxed the
scientific, rule-making and regulatory capabilities of scores of federal agencies ever
since. OCSLA and the FWPCA have been pervasively reworked9, moreover, in
Congress’s struggle to stay apace of the astonishing technological changes of ever
deeper and more remote OCS oil drilling and of the nation’s shift from pre-1970’s
environmental neglect to the often dystopian pessimism of the post-1970 era.
Following the 1969 Santa Barbara OCS blowout, these legislative efforts have
proceeded alongside an expanding network of other federal non-admiralty
environmental measures that often engage hybrid ocean/land venues or ocean
venues alone.10 But the initial stages of the Macondo Multi-District Litigation11
signal reluctance to take seriously Senator Edward Muskie’s summary of the driving
force behind OCSLA’s 1978 amendments: “[E]xploration, development and
production activities on the Outer Continental Shelf are no different than any other
source of pollution.”12
A. The Macondo Blowout as an Admiralty Tort
Master complaints and motions supporting and opposing dismissal in the
Macondo Multidistrict Litigation suggest that OPA and admiralty law –its
substantive rules as well as its procedures—may overwhelm OCSLA in the search
for rules and procedures governing the blowout’s economic losses.13 Indicative as
well is the decision of presiding Eastern Federal District of Louisiana Judge Barbier

Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (codified as amended
at 33 U.S.C. 2701-2761 (2006 & Supp. III 2009)[hereinafter OPA].
8 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat 1155 (1948) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. secs. 1251-1376 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
9 OCSLA, which has been significantly amended twice since its adoption in 1953, will
be referred to in text as OCSLA ’53, OCSLA ’78, and OCSLA ’90 to correspond to
whichever of OCSLA’s three phases is under discussion in text.
10 See infra Part III A. and Part III.B.2.
11In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20,
2010, MDL No. 2179 (Aug. 10, 2010).
12 124 Cong. Rec. 27265 (1978) (statement of Sen. Edward Muskie), debating report
entitled Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, H.R. Rep. No. 951474 (1978).
13 Remedies available under both OPA and OCSLA’s former title III, Pub. L. 95-372,
92 Stat. 629, Title III, secs. 301-315 (1978) [hereinafter title III], relate exclusively to
economic losses, not to personal injuries or death. In view of OPA’s repeal of title III
in Pub. L. 101-380, 104 stat. 484, sec. 2004 (1990), OPA, not OCSLA, is now the
source of economic loss remedies even if, as argued in Part IV.A., former title III
provisions afford valuable guidance in interpreting OPA key definitional terms, the
assessment of which is a principal object of this paper.
7
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devote the first MDL trial to the Concursus Petition of Transocean,14 the Deepwater
Horizon’s owner, under the Limitation of Shipowners’ Liability Act.15
Admiralty’s role in the controversy’s governance process should be
addressed early on, of course, and may turn out to merit the influence that almost all
MDL’s parties (and observers) seem eager to concede it. To them, the status of the
blowout’s status as an admiralty tort is essentially assumed, positioning Macondo’s
dominant issue instead as the extent to which admiralty and state law escape
displacement or preemption under OPA’s partial preclusion clauses, sections
2751(e) and 2718 respectively. Judge Barbier’s selection of the Concursus Petition
may prove a brilliant stroke that expedites management of the tragedy’s actual and
potential economic loss claims by opening the action to a larger group of parties and
causes of action than might be possible within OPA’s narrower confines.
The conventional case for admiralty jurisdiction proceeds largely, if not
exclusively, on the premise that the Deepwater Horizon qualifies as an OPA section
2701(37) “vessel,” which the section defines as “every description of watercraft or
other artificial contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation on water….” This definition corresponds, it is argued, to the United
States Supreme Court’s description of a vessel in Stewart v. Dutra Construction
Company as “any watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation
regardless of its primary purpose or state of transit at a particular moment.”16 A
creature of general maritime law, this definition has been codified for the better part
of a century and a half.17 Within the Macondo setting, moreover, the Deepwater
Horizon is a “vessel” engaged in exploratory drilling, an activity the Fifth Circuit has
christened “maritime commerce.”18 The discharge of oil from a vessel into navigable
waters has also been consecrated as a maritime tort.19 Although the Macondo well is
a non-admiralty OCSLA situs, the movement of its oil to the high seas assures its
In re the Complaint and Petition of Triton Asset Leasing GmbH for Exoneration
from and Limitation of Liability, Civil Action No. 4:10-CV-1721, June 23, 2010, 2010
WL 2541825 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
15 46 U.S.C. secs.181-189 (2000) (repealed and subsequently reenacted and codified
as the Limitation of Vessel Owner’s Liability Act at 46 U.S.C. sec. 30505 (2007)).
16 543 US. 481, 497 (2005) (defining the term “vessel” for purposes of the
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Act, 33 U.S.C. sec. 902(3)(g) (2009))
[hereinafter LHWCA].
17 Because the LHWCA lacks its own statutory definition, Dutra filled the gap by
reference to the term’s definition in 1 U.S.C. sec. 3 (2006), which claims statutory
provenance from the 19th Century.
18 See Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corp, 783 F.2d 538-39 (5th Cir, 1986); Pippen v. Shell
Oil Co., 661 F. 2d 378, 383-84 (5th Cir. 1981).
19 See In re New Jersey Barging Co., 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Salaky v. Atlas
Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), rev’d on other grounds, 208
F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1953).
14
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blowout’s status as a maritime tort pursuant to OCSLA sec. 1332(2)20 under two
earlier federal decisions.21
From an admiraltycentric perspective, OCSLA plays into the jurisdictional
discussion essentially through a single subsection, OCLSA sec. 1333(a)(2)(A).22 As
construed in the Fifth Circuit’s dominant jurisprudence and commentary, this
section further secures the Deepwater Horizon’s maritime status by including
among OCSLA situses only drilling rigs that are “fixed structures.” In 1978, OCSLA
section 1333(a)(1)23 was amended to extend federal law to “temporarily attached”
devices, such as the Deepwater Horizon, but the amendment has not been tested in
the context afforded by the Macondo setting. As a movable drilling platform,
therefore, the semisubmersible Deepwater Horizon is a “vessel” under Dutra and, it
is presumed, OPA section 2701(37) as well.
B. A Role for OCSLA’s Environmental/Public Lands Perspective?
Peering at these issues through an admiralty spyglass and genuflecting
before talismanic and, perhaps, inapt admiralty labels imprisons environmental
purposes and interpretations relating to federal lands as strangers in their own
home. Doing so ignores that OCSLA’s focus is Outer Continental Shelf “Lands,” not
“Waters,” and pays no heed to the extensive scope of Congress’s power under the
Property Clause to make “needful Rules and Regulations” respecting not only the
public lands themselves,24 but contiguous areas, resources and appurtenances
functionally linked to the nation’s proprietary and regulatory interests in its public
OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec.1332(2)(2006) requires that the statute be interpreted “in
such manner that the character of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf as
high seas and the right to navigation and fishing shall not be affected.”
21 Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Union Oil v. Oppen, 501 F.2d
558 (9th Cir. 1974).
22 In relevant part, the section provides that “[t]o the extent that they are applicable
and not inconsistent with this subchapter and other Federal laws and regulations of
the Secretary …, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State … are declared to
be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer
Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon….”
23 As amended, 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1)(2006) provides in material part that the
“Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States are
extended to the subsoil and the seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all
artificial islands, and all installations and other devices permanently or temporarily
attached to the seabed which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring
for, developing, or producing resources therefrom … to the same extent as if the
outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within
a state….”
24 U.S. Const. art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976),
discussed infra Part B.2.
20
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lands.25 Unwittingly perhaps, they champion a perception of OCSLA that freezes it in
its original 1953 form. Disregarded, therefore, is Congress’s infusion into OCSLA ’78
of pervasive environmental, pollution control and liability values,26 many of which
remain vital elements in OCSLA ’90, the statute’s third and current phase, or may
reasonably be employed to offer interpretative guidance for addressing elements of
OCSLA title III that were incorporated into OPA upon the latter’s repeal of the title.27
Admiraltycentic eyes also discount Macondo’s striking novelty. The fact is
that the courts have not had occasion to construe either OCSLA ’78 or OCSLA 90 as
sources of liability for the economic losses resulting from Macondo’s unique setting.
In consequence, issues as fundamental as the blowout’s status as an admiralty tort
cannot be predicted with the assurance or, at least, guidance that would have been
available had the issues been the subject of prior judicial scrutiny.
This paper advances a legal framework for the governance of Macondo’s
economic losses from a perspective that properly credits OCSLA’s status both as a
non-admiralty federal public lands and environmental measure, and as the OCS’s
parent statute. It identifies three independently sourced elements that interact
closely to shape the framework described in this paper. The first is the progressive
refashioning of OCSLA over three chronological phases. The second is the Macondo
scenario’s abrupt departure from what will be termed the “Fifth Circuit model” by
endowing OCSLA and, in particular, OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) with a prominent
role denied it under this model.
The third is the requirement that, to qualify as an admiralty tort, the activity
being pursued when the tortious event occurs must bear a ”substantial relationship
to a traditional maritime activity.“ Although formally introduced by Executive Jet
Aviation Company v. City of Cleveland,28 the “substantial relationship” requirement
was both anticipated in and exemplified by the Supreme Court in Rodrigue v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Company.29 Executive Jet and its progeny have increasingly been
integrated into OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) analysis, a trend this paper argues
poses a more severe threat to Macondo’s admiralty status than the questionable
status of the Deepwater Horizon as a “vessel.”30 The third inquiry, while valuable in
itself, also warrants re-examination of seemingly long-settled doctrines whose
dormant limitations surface in Macondo’s novel setting. This inquiry explores the
doctrines’ inadequacies as a point of departure for assessing whether or not
Macondo’s OCS drilling operations are in fact and law “substantially related to a
traditional maritime activity.”
See Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S 1007
(1982), discussed infra Part B.2.
26 See infra Part III.A.
27 See infra Part IV.A.
28 409 U.S. 249 (1972) [hereinafter Executive Jet].
29 395 U.S. 352 (1969) [hereinafter Rodrigue].
30 See infra Part III.D.3. and Part IV.B.2.
25
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1. OCSLA’s Three Phases
OCLSA three phases require a degree of individual and cumulative
assessment lacking because the courts have yet to address a dispute presenting
Macondo’s factual and legal profile. The closest litigation of record the author has
found are two opinions, the Oppen cases,31 dealing with economic damages suffered
in consequence of the 1969 OCS well blowout in the Santa Barbara Channel. Decided
prior to OCSLA’s amendment in 1978 and OPA’s adoption in 1990, they have been
overtaken by subsequent developments.32 But they do offer the provocative
conclusions, considered presently, that OCS drilling is a non-maritime activity,33 and
that movement of oil from an OCSLA situs to the sea above may qualify the
discharge as an admiralty tort.34
OCSLA ’53 secured the OCS against foreign and state territorial claims by
constituting it a component of federal public lands, and authorized the Executive
Branch to lease these lands for oil and gas production.35 Consistent with the pre1970’s era’s neglect of environmental values, however, OCSLA ‘53 ignored
management of the oil drilling’s environmental consequences and the allocation of
liability and remedies for OCS blowouts and spills. The next 15 years witnessed a
parade of OCS environmental disasters, the most notorious of which was the Santa
Barbara OCS blowout.
Congress introduced OCSLA’s second phase in 1978 by thoroughly rewriting
the statute to create a “new statutory regime”36 designed to address OCSLA 53’s
environmental voids. OCSLA ’78 expanded section 1333(a)(1)’s coverage from
“fixed structures” to “temporarily attached” installations such as the Deepwater
Horizon.37 Title III, OCSLA’s precursor to OPA title I, denied the latter status as
“vessels,” a term it strictly limited to watercraft transporting oil from “offshore
facilities.”38 Semisubmersibles, such as the Deepwater Horizon, and permanently
attached drilling platforms alike occupied the “offshore facility” category.39 Contrary
to the view denying the section 1333(a)(1) substantive force,40 the amendment’s
See Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1973); Union Oil v. Oppen, 501
F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
32 See infra TAN 182-93 and 217-18.
33 Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F. 2d 252, 256 (9th Cir. 1974); Union Oil v. Oppen, 501
F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1974)
34 Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F2d at 256; Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 401 F.2d at 562.
35 See infra TAN 75-77.
36 H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at 8, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1460.
37 See infra note 181.
38 See infra TAN note 179.
39 See infra TAN 177-79.
40 See infra Part II.C.1. and n. 72.
31
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linkage of the section and its “temporarily attached” devices to the new title III
confirmed the section as itself a source of federal substantive governance rules.
Congress also expanded OCSLA 53’s narrow focus on worker welfare and
events atop or concerning fixed drilling platforms –principally torts injuring
platform workers.41 OCS oil drilling’s environmental consequences would now be
addressed through a three-dimensional geographic/spatial model running
horizontally from the OCS to state coastlines and inland, and vertically from OCS
subsoil to superadjacent waters on up to the airshed above and extending well
inland over the affected state or states.42 Among their diverse purposes, section
1333(a)(1)’s amendment, a bevy of changes to other OCSLA ’53 provisions, and the
addition of title III were required to implement this regional ecological model, an

This paper’s focus on the Macondo tort under the OCSLA/OPA combination
accounts for its concentration on torts both in the Fifth Circuit model and in
Supreme Court precedents such as Rodrigue and Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,
477 U.S. 207 (1986). The Fifth Circuit model also addresses contract actions, among
others, involving such matters as platform construction, furnishings and
maintenance, and cross-indemnification agreements relating to employee injuries.
The paper occasionally cites Circuit OCSLA contract cases in assessing Executive Jet’s
substantial relationship principle. But it avoids incorporating into the Macondo tort
discussion doctrines premised on the OCSLA contract cases. General maritime law is
considerably more likely to preempt OCSLA-endorsed state law in OCS contract
cases than in OCS tort cases in which the tortious event occurs on an OCSLA situs.
This was not always so. Until 1969, the Circuit held that employee injuries resulting
from torts atop fixed drilling platforms were governed by maritime law as
“maritime” matters. See Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 67 (5th Cir.
1961)(general maritime law, not OCSLA-endorsed state law applies to tortious
personal injury atop fixed platform; “hazards and risks of injury” made regulable
under OCSLA by the Coast Guard are “essentially maritime”). Rodrigue objected to
the “maritime” characterization, and the Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that under
both Rodrigue and Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) the
applicable law is likely to be determined by the situs of the tort. But the Fifth Circuit
has ruled also post-Rodrigue that indemnity contracts relating to the same matter -employee injuries resulting from torts atop fixed platforms--may be governed by
general maritime law, which preempts the OCSLA alternative. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Glendel Drilling Co., 898 F.2d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1990); Lirette v. Popich Bros.
Water Transport, 699 F.2d 725, 729 (5th Cir. 1983). In Grand Isle Shipyard Inc. v.
Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir. 2009), the Circuit held that all indemnity
contract cases triggered by platform employee personal injury or deaths should
turn on a “focus-of-the-contract” rule, rather than on the tort-based rule stressing
the employee’s location at the time of injury.
42 See infra Part III A.
41
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approach that has been increasingly adopted in late-20th Century public lands
management.43
OCLSA’s final (and current) phase commenced with Congress’s enactment of
OPA ’90, which itself repealed OCSLA 78’s title III, while leaving in place both
amended section 1333(a)(1) and the various other changes designed in part to
implement OCSLA 78’s ecological model. The pertinent question here –again
unaddressed in the courts, and incorporated with ambiguous brevity by
Congress44—is the extent to which OPA itself incorporates these changes or leaves
them intact in OCSLA as a basis for joint management of OCS blowouts and spills.
2. The Fifth Circuit Model and the Macondo Scenario: A Comparison
The second concern –the Macondo scenario’s novelty for the courts—
explains both the absence of judicial attention to the foregoing issues and the lack of
fit between jurisprudence premised on the Fifth Circuit model and the demands of
the unique Macondo scenario. As addressed in this paper, the former typically
features a tort occurring atop or in proximity to an OCS fixed drilling platform. The
tort usually results in injury or death to the fixed platform worker. Under section
1333(a)(2)(A) the routine candidates for legal governance are limited either to
admiralty law or to the OCSLA-endorsed law of the adjoining state, with federal law,
other than admiralty law, rarely entering the picture. OCSLA’s preference for the law
of “each adjacent state” seeks to protect platform workers injured atop fixed
platforms who, as likely residents of the adjacent state, will be better served by their
state’s legal regimes than by general maritime law.45
In its vertical relationship with state law, (federal) admiralty law, under Fifth
Circuit jurisprudence addressed presently,46 will almost certainly prevail over
conflicting OCSLA-endorsed state law in a section 1333(a)(2)(A) contest in which
admiralty jurisdiction is engaged. Discarding Congressional intent as transparently
expressed in OCSLA’s legislative history and recited by the Supreme Court in
Rodrigue,47 the Circuit reasons that events that, pre-OCSLA, qualified as admiralty
See generally Christine Klein, Federico Cheever & Bret Birdsong, Natural
Resources Law: A Place-Based Book of Problems and Cases (2009).
44 OPA Subchapter I mentions the OCS at only two points, one in 33 U.S.C. sec.
2701(25) (West. Supp. 2010)’s provocative, if laconic, definition of “Outer
Continental Shelf offshore facility,” and the other in 33 U.S.C. sec. 2703(c)(3) (West.
Supp.), denying these facilities a financial cap for response cost liability.
45 See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
46 See infra note 119.
47 In Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F. 2d 456 (5th Cir. 1992) overruled on other
grounds, Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir.
2009), the court conceded that the Fifth Circuit’s “case law arguably conflicts with
OCSLA. As explained in Rodrigue, Congress intended that, after passage of OCSLA,
the oil and gas exploration industries would be governed by [OCSLA-endorsed] state
43
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events remain such post-OCSLA, and are deemed to “apply of their own force.”48
Reinforcing this outcome is the section’s bar against the application of state law that
is “inconsistent” with “other Federal laws,” the latter regarded as including these
admiralty rules that apply “of their own force.” From this reasoning follows an
additional rule securing admiralty law’s dominance: when admiralty and OCSLA
jurisdiction overlap, state law must yield to the former.49 The displacement of
OCSLA jurisdiction seals the victory for admiralty50 since “with admiralty
jurisdiction comes the application of substantive admiralty law.”51
The Macondo scenario departs sharply from this model. Although it too
entails a tort, its consequences issue as an economic loss, not personal injury or
death. Macondo’s engagement with two non-admiralty federal statutes produces a
variety of further departures. OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) specifically extends the
“laws … of the United States” to OCSLA situses.52 There can be no doubt that OCSLA
law [pursuant to OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006)].” Id. at 460. A candid
portrayal of the manner by which the Circuit has sidestepped Congressional intent
appears in Walsh v. Seagull Energy Corp 836 F. Supp. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1993), which
declares that the “legislative history of [OCSLA] clearly shows that Congress
intended to preempt the application of maritime law to activities on platforms on
the OCS [citing Rodrigue]. ” Id. at 414. Dissonance within the Fifth Circuit, however,
appears in Judge Politz’s ruling that “[a]s the Supreme Court made abundantly clear
in Rodrigue …, Congress intended that the law of the adjacent state would become
surrogate on fixed platforms on the Shelf to the exclusion of rules of admiralty and
common law.” Matte v. Zapata Offshore Co., 784 F.2d 628, 630 (5th Cir. 1986).
48 Circuit opinions premise this reasoning on two elements. The situses Congress
brought under the coverage of OCSLA ’53 –principally permanently attached
platforms, their appurtenances and the OCS subsoil, seabed and natural resources -would not engage admiralty jurisdiction under traditional admiralty principles. In
one of its dimensions moreover, Rodrigue favored OCSLA-endorsed state law on the
basis that, admiralty jurisdiction being inapplicable independently of OCSLA, failed
to apply “of its own force.” Rodrigue at 355, 366. The Circuit also reasons that the
reverse of this proposition is equally true: when independently of OCSLA, admiralty
law, traditionally considered, would have applied of its own force, it forms a part of
43 U.S.C. section 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006)’s “other Federal laws” with which the
OCSLA-endorsed state law is “inconsistent,” and hence disqualified from service as
surrogate federal law.
49 See, e.g., Recar v. CNG Producing Co., 853 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1988); Laredo
Offshore Constructors Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th Cir. 1985).
50 See Hufnagel v. Omega Services Indus., Inc. 182 F.3rd 340, 350 (5th Cir. 1999);
Smith v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 960 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir. 1992), overruled on other
grounds, Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir. 2009);
Laredo Offshore Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d at 1229, 1230-32 (5th Cir.
1985).
51 East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica v. Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986).
52 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1) (2006). See infra Part II.C.1.
10

and OPA, as a successor to title III, are applicable “laws … of the United States.”
Congress tailored them precisely to fix liability for economic loss resulting from
discharges on the OCS under OCSLA title III and, subsequently under OPA, both on
the OCS and within territorial seas.
The relationship between section 1333(a)(1)’s governing non-admiralty
federal statutory law and general maritime law therefore, reverses the relationship
between section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s state law and general maritime law. In the event of
conflict, maritime law, which preempts state law under the latter section, is
displaced by non-admiralty federal law under section 1333(a)(1).53 Consequently,
claims that OCSLA-endorsed law must yield to admiralty law in the event of
overlapping jurisdiction, that admiralty law “applying by its own force” overrides its
competitor, or that admiralty jurisdiction necessarily requires the application of
admiralty substantive state law are inapposite in the Macondo setting.
Among the most conspicuous differences between the two models are those
relating to their respective spatial/geographic ranges. The Fifth Circuit’s tort model
goes no further than accidents directly atop or in close proximity to fixed drilling
structures.54 Section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s preference for adjoining state law, as noted,
aligns with OCSLA ‘53’s solicitude for platform workers and their families, most of
whom, Congress assumed, would be residents of adjacent states.55 OCSLA ’78
occupies another dimension altogether that reaches from OCS subsoil to airshed and
from OCS to coastline and inland to fulfill OCSLA ‘78’s commitment to insure the
environmental integrity of an entire region.
In East River S.S. Corp v. Transamerica v. Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 864 (1986),
the Supreme Court was careful to state that it is only in the absence of an
intervening federal non-admiralty statute that “[w]ith admiralty jurisdiction comes
the application of substantive admiralty law.“ The force of Delaval’s caveat bites
hard if the latter is judge-made general maritime law since neither judge-made
common law nor general maritime law fare well in contests with competing federal
statutes. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312-19 (1981) (federal
common law of maritime pollution displaced by FWPCA which “speaks directly” to
the issue); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453
U.S. 1, 11-15(1981) (same); In re Oswego Barge Corp, 664 F.2d 327, 337-38 (2nd Cir.
1981) ( federal statutes presumptively displace general maritime law, particularly if
they “speak directly” to the matter at hand); cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union AFL-CIO, 451 U.S. 77, 96 (1981)(“[E[ven in admiralty … where the
federal judiciary’s lawmaking power may well be at its strongest, it is the Court’s
duty to respect the will of Congress.”).
54 75 feet from platform to accident appears to be the furthest the Fifth Circuit has
been willing to go in selecting OCSLA-endorsed state tort law. See Dearborn Marine
Service, Inc. v. Chambers & Kennedy, 499 F.2d 263 (5th Circuit 1974) (fireball from
platform incinerated a service vessel moored to it by a 75-foot rope).
55 See infra TAN 95-97.
53
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3. Rodrigue: Interpreting OCSLA and Anticipating Executive Jet
The United States Supreme Court decided Rodrigue in 1969, 16 years after
the passage of OCSLA ‘53 and three years prior to the Court’s decision in Executive
Jet. These cases are woven into the paper’s narrative because they pose in sweeping
terms the question dealt with more concretely to this point: why worry about
qualifying a matter as appropriate for admiralty jurisdiction, substantive rules and
procedures at all?
One response is because the Supreme Court worries about the issue and, in
at least two key decisions, one being Rodrigue, firmly declared Fifth Circuit
jurisprudence overly protective of its admiralty jurisdiction within the OCS
operations setting.56 In fact, the Supreme Court’s recognition that OCSLA is hostile to
admiralty law’s claim to govern OCS oil and gas drilling operations runs throughout
its OCSLA jurisprudence. The Court stated in Rodrigue that “[t]he bill [that became
OCSLA] applied the same law to the seabed and subsoil as well as to artificial
islands, and admiralty law was obviously unsuited to that task.”57 It reaffirmed in
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire58 that “admiralty jurisdiction generally should
not be extended to accidents in areas covered by OCSLA.” Most pointedly, it rejected
the claim that “comprehensive admiralty remedies apply under [OCSLA Sec.]
1333(a)(1),” in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,59 declaring instead that OCSLA “ousts
admiralty law and specifically directs that state law shall be adopted as federal law.”60
Another reason is fidelity to Congressional intent. Congress enjoys plenary
power over public lands under the property clause, among other non-admiralty
constitutional clauses that ground OCSLA. In the maritime pollution field, it has long
since overtaken judge-made common law- and general maritime law-making in this
complex endeavor.61 Special deference is owed to Congress’s role when the matter
The other is Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 (1986), which is discussed
infra Part II.D.3.
57 Rodrigue at 364.
58 477 U.S. 207, 218 (1986).
59 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971).
60 Id. at 105, n. 8 (emphasis added). Huson is the most explicitly hostile of the
opinions referenced in text. In response to the Circuit’s effort to fill a section
1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) gap with a federal common law remedy that duplicated an
admiralty rule, the Court reversed the Circuit on the ground that it was seeking “to
reintroduce [an admiralty] doctrine through a back door,” an approach the Court
complained that “subverts the Congressional intent documented in Rodrigue … that
admiralty doctrines should not apply under the Lands Act.” Id. at 104 (emphasis
added).
61 The disinclination and, indeed, inability of the courts to take on these burdens is
the overriding message of the cases cited supra n. 53. For a detailed account of
progressively complex engagement of federal statutory law and federal agencies in
the maritime pollution sphere, see President’s Report chs. 7-10; Lawrence Kiern,
56
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in question is amenable to governance under various constitutional powers other
than62 or, in the case of the OCS’s comprehensive governance, in opposition to the
admiralty clause. Congress’s choices, first, to frame a statute comprehensively
governing OCS matters under its interstate commerce, property and other nonadmiralty clause powers, and, second, expressly to eschew the admiralty clause for
this role in the proceedings leading to OCSLA ‘53’s adoption are not easily
accommodated with choosing admiralty law as the default law for matters that fell
within its purview pre-OCSLA.
Rodrigue merits attention independently of this larger question, of course,
given its iconic interpretation of OCSLA’s text. Construing the latter in the context
afforded by the Fifth Circuit model, it held that the law applicable under section
1333(2)(a) to the negligently caused deaths of two fixed drilling platform workers
was OCSLA-endorsed adjacent state law, not general maritime law. The decision
reversed the contrary view of the Fifth Circuit, which erred on the side of generously
construing admiralty’s reach by viewing the OCS oil production efforts as inherently
maritime in character.63 The Fifth Circuit response, as earlier noted, crippled OCSLA
section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s threat to admiralty jurisdiction by concluding that
notwithstanding the statute, matters within admiralty’s traditional sphere override
state law by continuing to apply “of their own force.”
The evident tension between the two tribunals finds further expression in
the Supreme Court’s Executive Jet decision, which it further refined during OCSLA’s
second and third OCSLA phases.64 Executive Jet is nothing if not a bold decision that
has proven unsettling to the admiralty pantheon’s guardians.65 It opens an
Liability, Compensation, Financial Responsibility under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 Tul. Mar. L. J. 451, Parts III-VI (2000).
62 Judge Rubin has observed that OCSLA “depends on national sovereignty and the
commerce clause; the cause of action it creates is one arising out of a general federal
statute, and federal court jurisdiction depends on the existence of a federal
question.” Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102, 1107 n. 12 (5th Cir. 1982).
63 Rodrigue reversed two Fifth Circuit opinions, Dore v. The Link Belt Co., 391 F.2d
671 (5th Cir. 1068) and Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 F.2d 216 (5th
Circuit 1968). The leading Fifth Circuit pre-Rodrigue opinion on the matter is Pure
Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961).
64 Executive Jet ’s progeny in order of appearance are Foremost Ins. Co. v.
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1989); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990); and Jerome B.
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company, 512 U.S. 527 (1995)
[hereinafter Grubart].
65 See, e.g., Robert Pelz, The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21 Tul. Mar. L. J.
103, 109 (1996) (substantial relationship test creates “inability to agree on
boundaries of maritime jurisdiction --much less to fashion a workable test”); David
Robertson & Michael Sturley, The Admiralty Extension Act Solution, 34 J. Mar. L. &
Com. 209, 212-23(substantial relationship test replaces a “simple and predictable
rule for determining admiralty tort jurisdiction” with “rococo judicial doctrine”).
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alternative route to implement the vision of OCSLA’s legislative history championed
in Rodrigue that cannot be nullified by the combined “application of its own force”
and “inconsistent with other Federal laws” devices.
Executive Jet’s goal is to align the choice of admiralty jurisdiction with subject
matter appropriate for admiralty’s procedures and substantive rules. A proper fit, in
Executive Jet’s formulation, requires that the pursuit giving rise to the action bear a
“significant relationship to a traditional maritime activity.”66 The linkage is intended
to bar the assignment of admiralty jurisdiction to a matter that is “only fortuitously
and incidentally connected to navigable waters and … bears no relationship to
traditional maritime activities.”67
Executive Jet’s rationale is rooted in Justice Holmes’s demystifying
recognition a half century earlier that admiralty law is not a “corpus juris,” but a
“very limited body of customs and ordinances of the sea.”68 Admiralty rules,
remedies and procedures are appropriate if the object of the litigation falls within
the ambit of these customs and ordinances.69 But the contrary applies if the object
falls outside of that circle, or, again, “is only fortuitously and incidentally connected
to …traditional maritime activities.”70
The Court rested the admiralty jurisdiction limitation on its general maritime
law-making power, rather than on the demands of a non-admiralty or other external
statute or requirement. A matter barred by the principle, therefore, cannot be
revived by recourse to section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s “of its own force” or inconsistent
with “other Federal laws” devices because the matter’s admiralty identity, if it ever
had one, is simply expunged. Executive Jet did not arise under OCSLA. But its
progressive integration into section 1333(a)(2)(A) analysis71 as an antidote to these
Executive Jet at 269.
Id, at 273.
68 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 235 (1917) (Holmes J., dissenting).
69 Hence, Executive Jet’s observation that
[t]hrough long experience, the law of the sea knows how to determine
whether a particular ship is seaworthy, and it knows the nature of
maintenance and cure. It is concerned with maritime liens, the general
average, capture and prizes, limitation of liability, cargo damage and claims
for salvage.
Executive Jet at 270.
70 Id. at 273.
71 See, e.g., Texaco Explor’n & Prod’n Inc . v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc.,
448 F.3rd 760, 770-71 (5th Cir. 2006), amended on rehearing, Texaco Explor’n &
Prod’n Inc v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., 453 F.3rd 652 (5th Cir. 2006); cert.
denied, AmClyde Engineered Products Co., Inc. v. Texaco Explor’n & Prod’n, Inc., 549
U.S. 1053, (2006) [hereinafter AmClyde]; ; Houston Oil & Minerals Corp. v. American
International Tool Co., 827 F.2d 1049, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, AMF
66
67
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devices accords OCSLA’s legislative history a level of influence that the Fifth Circuit
has otherwise chosen to deny it.
C. A Framework for Assessing OCSLA’s Role in the Macondo Blowout Litigation
The opening paragraphs identify four issues that call into question the
Macondo’s blowout’s status as an admiralty tort. Insistence that Macondo does not
merit this status, however, is neither the paper’s goal nor its burden. Placing the
question within a framework that honors Macondo’s essentially environmental and
public lands character is. The paper seeks to position the question where it belongs
by eschewing a myopic splitting of hairs over the “vessel” issue, conceived in
isolation from this framework, in favor of an inquiry in which this and several other
issues cede to OCSLA the role it merits as the OCS’s parent law.
Linking the four issues in their shared relation to this inquiry frames the
manner in which the paper will proceed. The first (the “Rodney Dangerfield issue”)
is the role and reach of OCSLA section 1333(a)(1). Is this section undeserving of a
role beyond merely proclaiming federal “sovereignty” 72 over the OCS, or does it
merit the respect due a versatile provision custom-rebuilt in OCSLA ’78 to
quarterback OCSLA’s and, derivatively perhaps, OPA’s management of the economic
consequences of the Macondo well blowout? Aside from its role within OCSLA as
such, does the section weaken the claim that OCS drilling is substantially related to a
traditional maritime activity under Executive Jet?
The second (the “Talisman Issue”) is the Deepwater Horizon’s status:
“temporarily attached” device, “vessel,” “MODU,” “offshore facility,” “Outer
Continental Shelf facility,” or some combination of the foregoing?
The third (the “Gusher Issue”) is whether Macondo oil, which is “nonadmiralty” at the OCS point of discharge, engages admiralty jurisdiction upon its
contact with superadjacent waters. The answer was affirmative in the Oppen Santa
Barbara blowout opinions, which were written prior to OCSLA ’78 and OPA ’90. This
Tuboscope, Inc. v. Houston Oil & Minerals Corp., 484 U.S. 1067 (1988). AmClyde is
discussed infra Part IV.B.2.
72 Professor David Robertson claims that the term “jurisdiction” in section
1333(a)(1) (2006) means “sovereignty,” and that the section’s purpose is merely “to
assert the federal government's exclusive dominion-- exclusive of any claims of
other countries and exclusive of any state claims-- over the resources beneath the
outer Continental Shelf.” Mistakes at 456. He also asserts that Congress’s purpose in
substituting the phrase “temporarily attached” devices for “fixed structures” in
OCSLA ’78 was merely to broaden sec. 1333(a)(1)(2006) in order to assure
exclusive “national dominion over all of the types of apparatus that are used for
exploiting the outer Shelf's mineral resources.” Id. at 498. For a different view of
these two matters premised on a detailed evaluation of their legislative history, see
infra Part II.C.1. and Part III 3.C.1, respectively.
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question primes an inquiry into OCSLA ’53’s provision denying any impact on the
“character of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf as high seas. ”73 It also
engages subsequent shifts, first, in the international community’s view of the
legitimacy of littoral states’ OCS sanitary and pollution regulation and, second, the
addition to OCSLA’s ‘53’s narrow top-of-the-platform perspective of OCSLA ‘78’s
ecological region focus.
The final question (the “Alien Issue”) steps outside of OCSLA, while
nonetheless actively drawing upon insights afforded by the three prior issues.
Following the Executive Jet line of decisions, it asks whether or not the OCS drilling
activities giving rise to the Macondo well blowout are sufficiently proximate to
traditional maritime pursuits to avoid alienage from admiralty jurisdiction.
To facilitate following the course of each inquiry in chronological time, a brief
“scorecard” is inserted following each phase.
Each topic is independent of the other. Separately addressing each, however,
would require constant repetition of and backtracking among differing statutory
texts, time periods, cases and judicial venues. The framework adopted here tracks
the influence of chronology, legislative history, and Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit
case law on the evolution of each issue as well on the ultimate convergence of
Rodrigue and Executive Jet in ascribing content to the “substantial relationship”
construct.74 The framework also demonstrates the influence of long-standing,
seemingly settled doctrines on choices concerning Macondo’s governance, and the
necessity of assessing each inquiry both in isolation from and in complex interaction
with the other three inquiries.
II: OCSLA Phase 1: OCSLA ’53 to ‘77
Through OCSLA, Congress implemented President Truman’s 1945
Proclamation75 bringing the resources of the OCS under the exclusive control and
jurisdiction of the United States federal government, and authorized the Department
of the Interior to award OCS oil and gas leases to qualified bidders. Commencing
with its declaration in Rodrigue that OCSLA “define[s] a body of law applicable to the
seabed, the subsoil and the … structures … on the Outer Continental shelf,”76 the
Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that OCSLA is the OCS’s parent law.77

OCSLA 43 US.C. sec. 1332(2) (2006).
Judicial decisions rendered subsequent in time to the phase being discussed are
occasionally considered when doing so produces clarity or brevity.
75 Truman Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg.13,303, Sep, 28, 1945; Exec. Order
No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305, 1945 WL 3400 (Sep. 28, 1945).
76 Rodrigue at 356.
77 See infra TAN 57-60.
73
74
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OCSLA covers an area of approximately 890,000 square miles off the coasts
of the 48 lower states and Alaska.78 OCSLA’s roots reach to the interstate and foreign
commerce clause79 and to Congress’s authority under the property clause to
“dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
the Property belonging the United States.”80 Congress’s insistence that OCS
jurisdiction vest solely in the federal government to the exclusion of the states and
of foreign nations speaks not only to its proprietary and trusteeship obligations, but
to the OCS’s significance in federal spheres as varied as national defense, the
national economy, federal revenue generation, and the conduct of international
relations. Conspicuous for its absence from this list is the admiralty clause. Not only
did Congress eschew reliance on the admiralty clause as OCSLA’s foundational
source,81 moreover, but the Supreme Court has recurringly mirrored Congress’s
discomfort with admiralty law’s fitness to govern OCS regulatory and proprietary
functions.82
Among the many issues posed by OCSLA ‘53’s adoption, the following three
merit attention in this paper:
1. Threading the needle: establishing the federal claim to OCS jurisdiction and
control without compromising freedom of navigation and fishing on the seas above
the OCS. In pursuing both goals, did Congress exclude OCSLA’s application to
superadjacent waters, thereby resolving the Gusher Issue in favor of admiralty
jurisdiction, at least under the 1953 measure?
2. Department of the Interior (DOI) Discretion: defining the purpose and scope
of the DOI’s authority to conduct the OCS leasing program. In failing to address
OCS’s oil drilling’s environmental dimension, does OCSLA ’53 deny itself the support
of a property clause predicate for a rationale that includes within the statute’s
coverage seas impacted by OCS oil drilling discharges?
3. Choice of law to govern OCS drilling activities; gap-filling in the absence of
federal law: identifying the governance system for qualified OCS situses and
activities from among federal admiralty law, federal non-admiralty law and state
law; and filling the gap, if any, created by the absence of applicable non-admiralty
federal law by selecting either admiralty/general maritime law or OCSLA-endorsed
state law serving as surrogate federal law. Congressional treatment of this group of
concerns commences the process of addressing various dimensions of all four
issues. Congress was still at work on this process during OCSLA’s third phase.
Macondo will likely tack a fourth phase of unpredictable dimension on the prior
three.
H.R. Rep. No. 83-413, at 2 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2178.
See supra note 62.
80 See U.S. Const. art. 4, sec. 3, cl. 2 discussed infra TAN 149 and Part III.B.2.
81 See infra Part II.C.2.
82 See supra cases cited supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
78
79
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A. Threading the Needle: OCSLA section 1332(2)
This issue is less significant in the present context for the underlying
problem it presents --preventing other nations from pointing to OCSLA to justify
undue claims for their OCS areas-- than for the implications of its solution for the
Gusher Issue. The view of the Santa Barbara Oppen opinions that migration converts
the discharge into an admiralty tort appears to receive support from OCSLA section
1332(2), which provides that OCSLA “shall be construed in such a manner that the
character of the waters above the high seas and the right to navigation and fishing
therein shall not be affected.” To like effect is State Department testimony offered or
referenced throughout the hearings process that
[t]he character as high seas of the waters above the Continental Shelf
remain[s] unaffected by the assertion or exercise of jurisdiction and control
over its resources. And consequently, rights to free navigation in and fishing
on such waters remain also unaffected.”83
Despite these passages, Congress did not relinquish its power to regulate
activities on the high seas as manifested, for example, in its traditional application of
admiralty law to them.84 Three levels of federal engagement were distinguished in
the hearings: outright sovereignty, jurisdiction and control, and regulation. OCSLA
‘53’s legislative history makes clear that Congress stopped short of claiming the
first, even for OCS situses.85 It claimed the second over OCSLA-declared OCS situses
Outer Continental Shelf: Hearing before the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 83rd Cong. 573(1953) [hereinafter Insular Hearings] (statement of
Jack B. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State).
84 Senate Committee member Watkins stated that the “entire theory of the draft is
that maritime law will apply, that is, by special provision in this Act to distinguish
[this Act] from the maritime law which will be in effect on the water itself.” Insular
Hearings at 23. The same view was expressed throughout the hearings. See, e.g., id.
at 597 (Senator Daniels), id. at 642 (Senator Condon), and id. at 668-69 (Richard
Young, Esq., Member of the New York State Bar). .
85 Senator Price Daniel of Texas, asserted that the bill stopped short of declaring full
“sovereignty” over the OCS and the superadjacent column as England had done.
“You have to look at [the jurisdiction and control claimed in OCSLA section 1332(1)
(2006)] as a certain amount of sovereignty from the seabed down. It is not complete
sovereignty because we make no claim from there up into the water or airspace.”
Insular Hearings at 21. Similar caution in dealing with the sovereignty appears in
United States v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (S.D. Fla. 1970) in which the United States declined
to assert “title” to semi-submerged OCS islands from which it sought to eject private
parties. OCSLA too stops short of claiming title: Section 1332(1) (2006)provides
that the “subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control and power of disposition….”
83
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and resources, but to dispel concern over any possible incursion on freedom or
navigation, it asserted, through Senator Condon, the bill’s presenter of S. Bill 1901 in
the Senate, the intent to limit OCSLA’s jurisdiction and control to only a “horizontal”
regime that encompasses the OCS’s subsoil, seabed and natural resources as a single
tranche.86
Congress adopted section 1332(2), in short, to prevent other nations from
impeding freedom of navigation and of fishing on the high seas on the basis that the
United States was itself exercising sovereignty over its OCS under OCSLA. Its
audience was the international community, not the states. This conclusion, it will
appear presently, is less critical for the narrowly ambited OCSLA ’53 than for
regionally focused OCSLA ’78.
B. DOI Discretion in Managing the OCS Leasing Program
With the hindsight afforded by OCSLA’s 1978 amendments, the most
shocking aspect to current observers of Congress’s 1953 delegation to DOI of
authority to manage the OCS leasing program is its failure to attend to the program’s
environmental consequences. The breadth of DOI’s discretionary authority recalls a
Cold War era obsessed with national security threats and comfortable in its faith
that the Administrative State will act with wisdom and unrestrained vigor in pursuit
of the public interest.
The former plays out in Congressional discussion and resulting OCSLA
provisions relating to staunch protection of the freedom of the seas for the nation’s
navy;87 exclusion of states from “intermingling of national and international rights”
associated with OCS management;88 reservation of the right to terminate leases89
and to exercise a right of first refusal to OCS mineral wealth in time of war or
necessity 90; to withdraw strategically significant OCS areas from leasing,91 and to
reserve OCS helium92 and “all other materials determined pursuant to … the
Atomic Energy Act … to be peculiarly essential to the production of fissionable
material…”93
The Secretary’s freedom to ignore environmental values is mirrored in
OCSLA ‘53’s absence of the citizen suit, environmental impact statement,
(emphasis added). Hence, the division in text among “sovereignty,” “jurisdiction and
control,” and “regulation.”
86 See 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).
87 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
88 See 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).
89 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(c) (2006).
90 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(b) (2006).
91 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(d) (2006).
92 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(f) (2006).
93 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1341(e) (2006).
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information disclosure, polluter-based civil liability, and state and local government
consultation provisions that were to become staples of the post-1969
environmental era. These voids appear with special clarity in OCSLA 53’s grant to
the Secretary to conduct the OCS leasing program:
The Secretary shall administer the provisions of this Act relating to the
leasing of the outer Continental Shelf, and shall prescribe such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. The Secretary
may at any time prescribe and amend such rules and regulations as he
determines to be necessary and proper in order to provide for the prevention
of waste and conservation of natural resources of the outer Continental Shelf
and the protection of correlative rights therein.94
Like Sir Conan Doyle’s dog that didn’t bark, the provision’s significance for the later
environmental age lies in what it does not say. DOI made no effort to claim or
implement the environmental rationale ultimately provided by OCSLA ’78 that
would justify extending OCSLA’s maritime pollution regulation well beyond drilling
platforms themselves.
C. Law Selection and Application under OCSLA Sections 1333(a)(1) and
(a)(2)(A)
Selecting the body of law to govern OCS drilling activities presented OCSLA’s
draftsmen with two problems of uncertain dimensions. Which OCS activities and
events should be targeted? Which body of law should govern these activities?
Senator Condon was clear that governance of the civil and criminal activities
of thousands of expected platform workers was a must.95 But neither he nor his
colleagues provided content for the prospective law’s coverage beyond his reference
to a “housekeeping law for the outer shelf,”96 which should address “industrial
accidents, accidental deaths, [and]‘peace and order.’”97 Congress’s appreciation that
unanticipated concerns would emerge over time perhaps explains why, beyond
activities atop drilling platforms, it chose a matrix consisting of one precise but
easily identifiable variable and a second imprecise variable, the content of which
would be filled in over time. Hence, OCSLA ‘53’s section 1333(a)(1)’s and (a)(2)(A)’s
S.B. 1901, sec. 5(a)(1), as reproduced in H.Rep. No. 83-413, at 3 (1953).
In presenting S.B. 1901, Senator Condon stressed the need for “so-called social
laws “ that would be needed to address the full range of civil and criminal law
requirements created by the anticipated thousands of OCS platform workers.” 99
Cong. Rec. 6962 (1953). For a contemporaneous account of these expectations, see
generally Warren Christopher, The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, Key to a New
Frontier, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 23 (1953).
96 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).
97 Id.
94
95
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fix on location, tightly defined to include only the OCS subsoil and seabed, artificial
islands, and fixed structures, and section 1333(a)(1)’s lock on activity, amply
conceived to encompass “exploring for, developing, or producing [OCS] resources …
or transporting such resources.”
1. Sections 1333(a)(1) and 1333(a)(2)(A): Of Substantive Law, Law Selection
and Law Application
The draftsmen then turned to selecting the body of law that would best
accommodate these criteria. OCSLA ‘53’s legislative history reflects that this socalled choice of law process –which, more accurately, is a constitutionally and
(federal) statutorily dictated law selection and application process -- features three
different candidates and a two-stage process. At the outset of the hearings, the
candidates were Congress’s federal non-admiralty law, (federal) admiralty/general
maritime law, and state law functioning ex proprio vigore.
Having presided over the Senate’s definitive rejection of admiralty law and
superintended a bill largely identical to the eventual OCSLA ’53 version, Senator
Condon confirmed this format in his statement that
to carry out the primary purposes of the measure, a body of law is extended
to the outer Shelf area, consisting of a) the Constitution and the laws and the
civil and political jurisdiction of the Federal Government; b) the regulations,
rules and operating orders of the Secretary of the Interior; and c) in the
absence of such applicable Federal law or adequate Secretarial regulation,
the civil and criminal laws of the State adjacent to the outer shelf area.”98
The two-stage process requires, first, determining whether applicable federal
non-admiralty law exists and, if so, selecting and applying it; and, second, only after
a determination that there is no applicable non-admiralty federal law,99 employing
as surrogate federal law an OCSLA-endorsed state law that is not itself
“inconsistent…with other Federal laws.” OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) addresses the
first stage; section 1333(a)(2)(A), the second.100
Sen. Rep. No. 83-411 at 2 (1953).
See, e.g., Nations v. Morris, 483 F.2d 577, 585 (5th Cir. 1073) (the term “applicable
[in section 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) must] be read in terms of necessity –necessity to
fill a significant void or gap.”); Continental Oil Co; v. London S.S. Owner’s Mut. Ins.
Ass’n, Ltd., 417 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970)
(same).
100 The discussion in text addresses the selection of law applicable to a controversy
in which OCSLA subject matter jurisdiction has already been established under
OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec. 1349(b)(1) (2006), a requirement that Macondo litigation
obviously satisfies as a case or controversy “arising out of, or in connection with …
any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration,
development, or production of the minerals … of the outer Continental Shelf.” See In
98
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So focused has been the attention of most courts and commentators on the
latter section that they have generally overlooked that section 1333(a)(1) also
licenses a law identification and application process that, when applicable federal
law to be applied is present, takes priority over section 1333(a)(2)(A). Macondo
affords the obvious example: the OCSLA/OPA combination provides the applicable
federal law under section 1333(a)(1), and this law will provide the dominant and,
possibly, exclusive basis for affixing liability for economic loss.
Nor is there any reason to conclude that the section would be any less
capable than section 1333(a)(2)(A) of generating other substantive effects.101 Let us
anticipate for purposes of current argument that the OCSLA ‘78 amendment
bringing “temporarily attached “ drilling platforms under section 1333(a)(1) is in
effect, and ask why a tort involving these platforms is any less subject to governance
under this section as applicable law than a tort occurring on a “fixed structure”
under section 1333(a)(2)(A).
Denying that section 1333(a)(1) is endowed with law-selecting and -applying
authority while affirming this authority in section 1333(a)(2)(A) is indefensible.
Rodrigue itself opens with the proposition that “[s]ection [1333(a)(1)]extends the
‘Constitution and laws … of the United States’” to OCSLA situses, then immediately
complements this declaration with the assertion that “[a]ll law applicable to the
outer Continental Shelf is federal law….”102 Both of these sections, moreover, appear
under the heading “Laws and regulations governing land”, not the current
sovereignty” section 1332, entitled “Congressional declaration of policy.”103 Nor is
there any perceivable linguistic basis for assigning different lawre Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” MDL No. 2179, 2010 WL 3943451
(E.D. La. 2010) (Barbier, J.).
101 EP Operating Ltd. Ptns’p v. Placid Oil Co. 26 F.3rd 563, 570 (5th Cir. 1994) states
that “[the] body of substantive law identified in Section 1333 was intended ‘to
govern the full range of potential legal problems that might arise in connection with
operations on the Outer Continental Shelf. [citing Laredo Offshore Constructors, Inc.
v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d. 1223, 1228 (5th Cir. 1085)] Thus, the OCSLA casts a broad
substantive net in section 1333.” The court continued that “we find that the most
consistent reading of the statute instructs that the jurisdictional grant of section 1349
should be read co-extensively with the substantive reach of section 1333.” EP
Operating Ltd. Ptns’p at 569 (emphasis added).
102 Rodrigue at 356.
103 An additional goal of section 1333(2) as amended by OCSLA ’78 may have been
to bring OCS drilling fixtures of all kinds under OCSLA’s coverage, as Professor
Robertson suggests. See note supra note 72. But the considerations addressed in
text when combined with the role OCSLA ’78 assigns section 1333(a)(1) (2006) in
conjunction with title III’s civil liability regime, among other 1978 amendments,
reflect that Congress’s primary motivation lay elsewhere than this secondary and,
given the wording of OCSLA sec. 1332(1) (2006), largely redundant task.
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selection/application outcomes to the two sections. OCSLA’s drafters104, the
Supreme Court 105and OCSLA itself106 repeatedly use the terms “apply” or
“applicable” (section 1333(a)(2)(A)) interchangeably with the term “extend”
(section 1333(a)(1)). Pertinent as well is Senator Condon’s bundling together
without distinction or qualification both sections’ sources of law –federal law
(section 1333(a)(1)), on the one side, and Secretarial regulations and state law
(section 1333(a)(2)(A)) on the other.
2. Admiralty Law, Federal Non-Admiralty Law or State Law?
Although amendments or earlier versions of House and Senate legislation
provided that OCS operations be governed either by admiralty law or by state law as
such, federal non-admiralty law was the hands-down winner in a legislative debate
in which admiralty law never made it to the finishing line. The original Senate bill
cleared the way for admiralty law’s preemptive governance of OCS activities in its
declaration that “[a]ll acts occurring on any structure (other than a vessel) located
on OCS or waters above shall be adjudicated according to the laws relating to such
acts or offenses occurring on vessels of the United States on the high seas.” 107 But
the Senate unequivocally withdrew its support for admiralty law in the course of
vigorous, subsequent debate.
Opposition centered on three principal objections, each of which reflect
admiralty law’s remoteness from OCS operations. The first and perhaps most
influential was admiralty law’s inability to furnish what Senator Condon termed
“‘so-called social laws’“ for the protection of affected workers and their families.”108
The second was that admiralty’s choice of the “law of the shipowner’s place” might
Illustrative of passages found throughout the reports and debates of both houses
is the Senate Report’s statement that the “jurisdiction of the Federal Government is
extended to [OCSLA situses]….[and] the Constitution and laws of the United States
are made applicable….” Insular Hearings supra note 83, at 17-18.
105 The Supreme Court’s assessment of 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1) (2006) in Rodrigue
similarly treats the latter’s term “extend” as interchangeable with “applicable” or
“apply” in the Court’s observation that the section “makes ‘the Constitution and laws
of the United States’ apply to the same extent as if the outer Constitutional Shelf
were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a state.” Rodrigue at
357. (emphasis added).
106 OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec.1333(f) (2006) reinforces the “applicability” of federal law in
43 sec. 1333(a)(1) by declaring that specification “of certain provisions of law [in 43
U.S.C. sec.1333(a)]… shall not give rise to any inference that the application … of any
other provisions of law is not intended.” (emphasis added). “Any other provisions of
law,” of course, includes the “laws … of the United States” referenced in 43 U.S.C. sec.
1333(a)(1) (2006).
107Insular Hearings, supra note 83, at 2.
108 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).
104
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lead to the application of different laws to the same incident in the event of multiple
owners or operators of OCS facilities.109
A third objection was that “[m]aritime law in the strict sense has never had
to deal with the resources in the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is ill
adapted for that purpose.”110 This objection departs from the narrow spatial
confines or purposes associated with the employer/worker and worker/worker
interactions atop drilling platforms. The subject of comment in Rodrigue as well, its
scope remained largely undefined until the completion of OCSLA’s second and third
phases.
State law111 also failed to gain unqualified support despite its forceful
advantage over admiralty law that it addresses head-on the welfare concerns of
adjacent state platform workers. The principal objections focused on the status of
the OCS as “uniquely an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction and control,”112 and
the impropriety for the conduct of the nation’s foreign policy of “intermingling of
national and international rights in the area.”113 Muted in the hearings but clearly
influential114 was also Congress’s desire to reserve OCS oil drilling public revenues
to the federal government, having just surrendered to the states title to and revenue
associated with submerged lands drilling under their territorial seas.115
But Congress nevertheless established state law’s superiority over admiralty
law in a compromise the Supreme Court described as having been achieved by
“dropping the treatment of [fixed drilling structures] as ‘vessels’ ….”116 The
compromise was neither about nor designed to accommodate admiralty law, which
Congress unceremoniously excised by denying the fixed structures status as “vessels.”
The accommodation was between state and non-admiralty federal law, and the
compromise took form as canonizing the former as surrogate federal law, not as
providing for admiralty law’s reentry through a back door as majority Fifth Circuit
jurisprudence subsequently decreed. 117
See generally Insular Hearings, supra. n. 83 at 411-35.
Insular Hearings, supra note 83, at 668 (statement of Richard Young, Esq..
Member of the New York State Bar).
111 H.B. 5134, sec. 9(a) authorized the Secretary of the Interior to adopt the laws of
the adjacent state ex proprio vigore if the state so provides, and to reimburse the
state for its administrative costs. See H.R. Rep No. 83-413, at 8-9 (1953).
112 99 Cong. Rec. 6961, 6963 (1953).
113 Id.
114OCSLA , 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) provides that “State taxation laws
shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf.”
115 See Submerged Lands Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953) (codified
at 43 U.S.C. secs. 1311(a) (2006)). OCSLA ’53 took form as an amendment to this Act.
116 Rodrigue at 365.
117 See supra note 60.
109
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D. Rodrigue, the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit
State law exerts less influence in the Macondo scenario than in the Fifth
Circuit model because Macondo pits federal law –OCSLA and OPA—against general
maritime law, not general maritime law against state law. But it is considered at
length here for several reasons. One is that the evident disparity between the Fifth
Circuit’s treatment of the issue and OCSLA’s legislative history is hostile to the claim
that OCS drilling operations satisfy Executive Jet’s substantial relationship test.
Macondo may present, in addition, a “mini-gap” problem, which arises when the
section 1333(a)(1) applicable federal law filling the “maxi-gap” is itself pockmarked
with a void or two that requires the use of section 1333(a)(2)(A) to fill the resulting
“mini-gap.” Possibly illustrative is the silence of OPA, as one of the applicable
section 1333(a)(1) federal laws, on punitive damages, which some observers
believe is a void, rather than a conscious omission, that needs to be filled in this
manner. Finally, the discussion provides a convenient portal into Rodrigue itself.
Like all truly seminal cases, Rodrigue works on multiple levels, some of them
apparent only years after decision day. Its significance in the Fifth Circuit has waxed
or waned in consequence of such changes external to itself as the successive
amendment of OCSLA over a half-century and the four-decade evolution of the
Executive Jet principle, including its gradual convergence, if not fusion with Rodrigue
itself.118 Rodrigue’s levels align with minimalist, mid-level and Executive Jet-level
readings. At the last-named level, Rodrigue is experiencing a second life in which,
ironically, it is proving even more toxic to inappropriate admiralty claims than had
it not been neutralized by the Fifth Circuit in its first life.
1. The Minimalist Level
The Circuit’s minimalist position essentially involves four steps. The first is
that OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s and (a)(2)(A)’s references to federal law are
generic; they do not expressly exclude or otherwise restrict admiralty law despite
Congress’s hostility to the latter as the appropriate vehicle for OCS governance.
Second, section 1333(a)(2)(A) disqualifies an OCSLA-endorsed state law candidate
if it is “inconsistent” with “other Federal law” which, under the first step, includes
admiralty law. Third, the locations referenced as OCSLA situses by the statute are
not traditional admiralty situses in any event; therefore, events or locations that
qualified for admiralty jurisdiction pre-OCLSA continue to do so post-OCSLA on the
basis that admiralty law “applies of its own force.” Fourth, if admiralty law is found
to apply of its own force, inconsistent state law must yield both because admiralty
jurisdiction ousts OCSLA jurisdiction if the two overlap, and because admiralty law

118

See infra Part IV.B.2.
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prevails under OCSLA as the “other Federal law” with which the state law is
inconsistent.119
2. The Mid-Level
Rodrigue’s second level takes the Supreme Court’s straightforward
evaluation of Congress’s negative perception of admiralty law at face value, and
employs it to balance out the Fifth Circuit’s selective interpretation of Rodrigue,
which is not inaccurate within its tight self-chosen parameters. It is true, as the
Circuit reasons, that the Supreme Court agreed that OCSLA situses, as defined by
Congress, would not have activated admiralty jurisdiction under traditional
principles.120
But Congress’s designation of these situses as if they were non-admiralty
destinations in actual fact was as fanciful an exercise as Congress’s earlier
designation of the Guano Islands as a United States “vessel” in order to administer
these actual islands under United States admiralty law.121 Indeed, the Senate’s initial
OCSLA draft would have constituted the OCSLA situses admiralty sites,122 which
they are for purposes of the Admiralty Extension Act.123 But for Congress’s
solicitude for the welfare of adjacent state platform workers, the Senate’s
designation of sites as “vessels” would not have been expunged, and fixed drilling
platforms would be admiralty situses.124 Ascribing ontological status to an utterly
discretionary label –equating a statutorily designated “artificial island” with an
actual island, for example-- is a useful admiralty jurisdiction-protective device in the
same way in which claiming a watercraft is a really a “vessel” independent of its
classification in the statute pertinent to the inquiry serves the same purpose. Just
ask Lewis Carroll.125
The Supreme Court would appear to have done so, as evidenced by its
statement that

For a step-by-step summary of the Fifth Circuit’s logic as seen from the bench,
see Walsh v. Seagull Energy Corp., 836 F. Supp. 411 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
120 See Rodrigue at 355.
121 See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
122 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
123 46 U.S.C. sec. 30101 (2006). See Continental Oil Co. v. London S.S. Owners’ Mut.
Ins. Ass’n, 417 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1969) (Admiralty Extension Act applies to
collision of vessel with an OCS fixed drilling platform).
124 See Rodrigue at 365.
125 The reference, of course, is to Humpty Dumpty who, like Congress, can have its
language mean “just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” Lewis
Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There 213 (Martin
Gardner ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2000)(1897).
119
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[e]ven if admiralty law would have applied to the deaths occurring under
traditional principles, the legislative history shows that Congress did not
intend that result. First, Congress assumed that admiralty law would not
apply [to the OCS situs] unless Congress made it apply, and then Congress
decided not to make it apply.126
The statement effectively paraphrases Humpty Dumpty’s response to a perplexed
Alice: “The question is …. which is to be master –that’s all.” In placing Congress in
the role of “master,” the Court acknowledges that Congress intends OCSLA, not
admiralty law, to serve as the OCS’s parent law, and that unless Congress chooses
otherwise --presumably by a statute to the contrary-- such OCSLA shall be.
Why would the Court impose the burden on Congress to negate the use of the
OCSLA alternative in a particular case rather than placing the burden to show that
admiralty law does not apply on the party invoking OCSLA, as the Fifth Circuit does?
The answer is spread throughout Rodrigue’s pages. OCSLA’s oil and admiralty’s water
simply don’t mix. Addressing the inapplicability of admiralty law not only to fixed
platforms, but to the OCS seabed and subsoil, the Court counseled that the Senate
Committee “was acutely aware of the inaptness of admiralty law. The bill applied
the same law to the seabed and subsoil as well as to the artificial islands, and
admiralty law was obviously unsuited to that task.127
Even more telling is the Court’s assessment of an admiralty expert’s testimony
that “[m]aritime law in the strict sense has never had to deal with the resources in
the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is ill adapted for that purpose”128:
Since the Act treats seabed, subsoil, and artificial islands the same, dropping any
reference to special treatment for presumptive vessels, the most sensible
interpretation of Congress' reaction to this testimony is that admiralty treatment
was eschewed altogether….129
3. The Executive Jet Level
A third way of reading Rodrigue is to isolate passages that stun in departing
from the OCSLA situs issue altogether to ask whether, in light of the purpose of the
activity giving rise to the plaintiffs’ deaths, admiralty jurisdiction applies at all. The
Rodrigue at 361 (emphasis added). For other examples of Congress’s assignment
of shifting and even conflicting connotations to the same definitional term that place
it within or outside of the “vessel” category, see the discussion of OCSLA’s and OPA’s
definitions of the terms “temporarily attached” installation, “MODU,” “offshore
facility,” and “Outer Continental Shelf facility” infra Part IV. A.
127 Id. at 364-65.
128 Insular Hearings, at 669 (Statement of Richard Young, Esq., Member of the New
York State Bar).
129 Rodrigue at 365 n.12.
126
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pertinent passages are those relating to the Court’s discussion of its 1908 action
sustaining, without opinion130, a federal district court decision, Phoenix Construction
Company v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 131 holding that the collision of a vessel with a
platform erected around piles placed in the Hudson River to support construction of
an aqueduct did not engage admiralty jurisdiction.132 The Court expressly approved
the lower court’s ruling denying admiralty jurisdiction because the project’s
purpose –supplying water transported by the aqueduct to a metropolitan area-was, in terms used by the lower court133 and approved in Rodrigue,134 “not even
suggestive of maritime affairs.”
The Court offered further insight into its view of purpose seventeen years later
in Herb’s Welding, Inc. v. Gray,135 which reversed a Fifth Circuit holding that an
injured welder who worked on pipelines and drilling platforms was engaged in
“maritime employment” under LHWCA sec. 902(3). Declaring that the Circuit’s
position that “offshore drilling is maritime commerce” is “untenable”, it singled out
Rodrigue’s use of Phoenix to reassert that drilling platforms are “not even suggestive
of maritime affairs.”136 The Court then linked its purpose inquiry back to OCSLA by
adverting to Rodrigue’s assessment of OCSLA’s legislative history to conclude that
the latter “at the very least forecloses the Court of Appeals holding that offshore
drilling is a marine activity….”137 The plaintiff, the Court stated
built and maintained pipelines and the platforms themselves. There is nothing
inherently maritime about those tasks. They are also performed on land, and
their nature is not significantly altered by the marine environment, particularly
since exploration and development of the Continental Shelf are not themselves
maritime commerce.”138
The purpose analysis is joined at the hip with, if not identical to Executive Jet’s
substantial relationship test,139 which helps explain why Executive Jet singles out
Phoenix Construction Co. v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 212 U.S. 558 (1908).
Phoenix Construction Co. v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 162 F. 494 (1908).
132 Rodrigue at 360.
133 Phoenix Construction Co., 162 F. at 496.
134 Rodrigue at 360.
135470 U.S. 414 (1986).
136 Id. at 424-25.
137Id. (emphasis added).
138 Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
139 Illustrative of the essential interchangeability of the two cases in the OCS drilling
context is the Fifth Circuit’s use of Rodrigue to deny admiralty jurisdiction on
grounds functionally indistinguishable from Executive Jet’s substantial relationship
test. See, e.g., Hufnagel v. Omega Service Indus. Inc., 182 F.3rd 340, 353 (5th Cir.
1999); Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Eng’g. Corp, 895 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, Union Texas Petroleum v. State Service Co., 498 U.S. 848 (1990).
130
131
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Rodrigue as an exemplar of the position it espouses.140 Both ask essentially the same
question: is there a sufficient fit between admiralty and the pertinent activity –the
provision of water to a municipality in Phoenix, or the airplane flight between two
fixed land locations in Executive Jet—to warrant subjecting the latter to admiralty’s
jurisdiction, rules and procedures?
E. Of Maxi-Gaps, Mini-Gaps, Section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s “other Federal laws,” and
Admiralty Law’s “Application of its own Force”
OCSLA Section 1333(a)(2)(A) will not play the same role in the Macondo
setting that it does under the Fifth Circuit model, if indeed it plays any role at all.
The former model, as earlier noted, opposes OCSLA and OPA with their admiraltydisplacing capabilities against general maritime law, while the latter pits federal
general maritime law against state law. The Fifth Circuit model’s concern is with
“maxi-gaps,” that is, a complete absence of federal law under section 1333(a)(1),
which must be filled through the section 1333(a)(2)(A) vehicle. Macondo avoids
maxi-gaps because OCSLA and OPA provide comprehensive and detailed federal law
pursuant both to the section 1333(a)(1) and as independent statements of
applicable federal law.141
But section 1333(a)(2)(A) may not fall out of the picture altogether. It will if
a court were to conclude that in an action for economic loss, OPA, as successor to
OCSLA’s title III, totally supplants general maritime law because it speaks
seamlessly (without gaps) to Macondo’s economic loss issues. But if a void or two is
found in the interstices of OPA’s otherwise comprehensive coverage, section
1333(a)(2)(A) will likely be needed to fill these “mini-gaps.” 142
How will Macondo’s pre-OCSLA status as a maritime tort play out? The
minimalist Fifth Circuit approach brings admiralty law in through section
1333(a)(2)(A)’s back door, assuming any of the following do not occur. Executive
Jet/Rodrigue reasoning rules admiralty jurisdiction out altogether. Macondo loses its
status as an admiralty event under OCSLA/OPA because the Gusher and the
Talisman issue are resolved against admiralty. Macondo reaches the Supreme Court,
which chooses to resolve its tug of war with the Fifth Circuit by confirming the
previously quoted view it expressed in Huson that OCSLA “ousts admiralty law and
specifically directs that state law shall be adopted as federal law.”
Executive Jet at 258-59.
OPA’s legislative history reflects Congress’s intent through OPA to enact a single,
comprehensive federal act providing clean-up authority, penalties and liability for
oil pollution S. Rep 101-94, at 8-9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 802.
See, e.g., Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (Am.). Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 750 (E.D. La. 2009);
Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atlantic Corp., 924 Fed. Supp. 1436,
1447 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 122 F. 3rd 1062 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 1021
(1998).
142 See supra text accompanying notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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A simpler resolution would have the Fifth Circuit follow the direction limned
in Rodrigue and proposed in its own Laredo Offshore Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil
Company143: refuse to strike the OCSLA-endorsed state law absent a statute
preferring admiralty law. A federal statute will likely be required in section
1333(a)(2)(A) contests when the OCSLA-endorsed measure’s claimed inconsistency
is with a non-admiralty federal matter. Why shouldn’t admiralty be held to a
requirement of at least parity with non-admiralty federal spheres? In OCSLA ’53’s
legislative history, moreover, Congress expressly denied that admiralty law should
serve as OCS’s default law. Yet the Fifth Circuit’s minimalist position re-establishes
general maritime law in precisely this role. It is anomalous, finally, to restore
admiralty law in the Macondo setting where the norms precluding the maxi-gap are
themselves non-admiralty and in OCSLA’s instance, anti-admiralty federal statutes.
F. Scorecard: OCSLA Phase I
Rodney Dangerfield Issue: Lack of respect for sec. 1333(a)(1) is premature (as
well as inconsistent with OCSLA’s legislative history) because the question is not
seriously tested in Phase I. Judicial focus on OCSLA sec. 1333(a)(2)(a) was
appropriate during this phase because the Fifth Circuit model largely accommodates
the era’s litigation paradigm.
Talisman Issue: “Fixed structures” are targeted both in sec. 1333(a)(1) and
(a)(2)(A) during phase I, rendering classification of non-fixed, i.e., mobile or floating
structures, as “vessels” non-controversial. That this interpretation might be
erroneous, however, appears retroactively in OCSLA ’78’s legislative history, in
which the Congressional conferees explained that the 1978 substitution in OCSLA
section 1333(a)(1) of “temporarily attached” devices for “fixed structures” is
intended to be “technical and perfecting and is meant to restate and clarify and not
to change existing law.” 144
Gusher Issue: Section 1332’s protection of freedom of navigation is not an
abnegation of Congress’s power to regulate the high seas for police and sanitary
purposes. But the latter function was vaguely in play, if at all, in OCSLA ’53 litigation,
which centered on activity atop platforms and the welfare of platform workers and
their families, not pollution and public lands control activities throughout the
platform’s region.
Alien Issue: The substantial relationship rationale was afforded great respect,
and quickly found itself on a post-1972 course favoring integration as a component
of the Fifth Circuit’s OCSLA sec. 1333(a)(2)(A) inquiry.145

754 F.2d 1223, 1230-1232 (5th Cir. 1985)
H.R. Rep. No. 95-1474, at 6 (1978)(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1674, 16479 (emphasis added).
145 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 139; infra Part IV.B.2.
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III. OCSLA Phase II: OCSLA ’78 –‘90
The quarter century following OCSLA’s enactment saw a nation-wide
embrace of environmental consciousness, the proliferation of environmental
statutes, a loss of public confidence in agency expertise and independence from the
regulated sector, the drilling of OCS wells ever deeper and further out through
revolutionary advances in technology and drilling platform design and construction,
and, ominously, scores of catastrophic oil spills. The 1969 Santa Barbara OCS well
blowout, in fact, ushered in the post-60’s environmental era. By the mid-70’s,
successful NEPA suits and drilling moratoria covering much of the nation’s east and
west coasts severely hampered OCS oil production,146 which the federal
government, then as now, viewed as essential for national defense and economy and
for federal revenue.147 The stage was set for redrafting OCSLA to rein in DOI
discretion, and to remedy the 1953 Act’s inattention to the federal government’s
trusteeship obligations over its public lands and to OCS petroleum discharges.
A. Overview of the “New Statutory Regime”
The summary of the senate bill addressed in the Senate Ad Hoc Committee’s
report premised OCSLA ‘78’s transformation on Congress’s plenary power under
the property clause set forth in Kleppe v. New Mexico.148 Congress, the summary
declares
has a special constitutional responsibility to make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
United States under article IV, section 3, clause 2. The existing Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act is essentially a carte blanche delegation of
authority to the Secretary of the Interior. The increased consideration of the
importance of OCS resources, the increased consideration of the
environmental and onshore impacts, and emphasis on comprehensive
planning require that Congress detail standards for the Secretary (of DOI) to
follow in the exercise of his authority.”149
This litigation as well as the policy issues dividing environmentalists from the
federal government and the oil industry are detailed in Robert Wiygul, The
Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer Continental Shelf, 12 J. Energy,
Nat. Res. & Environmental Law 785 (1992).
147 See President’s Commission Report at 59-67
148 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (the “power over public land thus entrusted to Congress is
without limitations”)(quoting United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310
U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).
149 H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1461.
146
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Senators understood in 1978 that they were not simply tinkering with their
earlier work. On the contrary, they described OCSLA ’53 as “outmoded,”150 and
undertook “to provide a new statutory regime for the management of the oil and
natural gas resources of the OCS.”151
The “new statutory regime” addressed five perceived defects of OCSLA ’53. At
the top of the list was Congress’s intention to introduce balance between what
Senator Henry Jackson, Senate Committee chair, described as “oil and gas
development and [the] potentially adverse economic, social and environmental
impacts that accompany it.”152 The revised statute “goes a long way toward
alleviating the public’s fears that were spawned by the disastrous Santa Barbara
Channel blowout nine years ago and by other environmentally destructive oil spills
from tankers that followed.”153
The environmental side of the balance offers a second element: management
of the OCS blowout and spill pollution threat through a variety of amended
provisions154 alongside a totally new title III, which largely anticipates OPA’s
Id. at 9.
Id. at 8.
152 124 Cong. Rec. 27262 (1978).
153 Id. Senator Dewey F. Bartlett added that “the “most serious cause of delays in the
Outer Continental program to date have been a series of vexatious environmental
law suits which have delayed a number of Outer Continental Shelf lease sales.” Id. at
27263. Of special relevance to this paper is Commonwealth of Massachusetts v.
Andrus, 94 F.2d 872 (lst Cir. 1979), which, on the basis of Congress’s adoption of
OCSLA ’78, lifted a preliminary injunction imposed by the lower court under NEPA
on the leasing of submerged lands in the fisheries-rich Georges Bank region. The
Circuit Court reasoned that OCSLA ‘78’s battery of environmental safeguards would
duplicate the environmental scrutiny demanded by NEPA.
154 For a detailed account of these provisions, see Robert Wiygul, supra note 152 at
Parts II-IV. Of special relevance for this paper are the inclusion in 0CSLA 43 U.S.C.
sec. 1331 (2006) of subsections (f)-(i) defining, respectively, the terms “affected
state,” “marine,” “coastal” and “human environment[s];” and subsections (k)-(m)
expanding the definitions, respectively of “exploration,” “development,” and
“production.” These provisions explicitly merge consideration of OCS oil operations
on distant OCS locations with their environmental and pollution control
consequences on state territorial seas and state inland areas. They thereby add the
other half of the environmental equation omitted by OCSLA ‘53’s focus on the OCS
operations alone. OCSLA 43 USC sec. 1333(6) (2006) singles out the need to address
“blowouts, loss of well control, fire, spillages … or other occurrences which may
cause damage to the environment or to property or danger life or health.” Meriting
special attention is OCSLA ‘78’s substitution of the phrase “and all installations and
other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed” for the former
“fixed structures” in 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1) (2006) and ancillary section
150
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Subchapter I liability and compensation elements. OCSLA’s “new statutory regime’s”
contrasts with the Fifth Circuit model are stark. The Circuit’s jurisprudence, as
noted, is premised on a discrete tort-atop-the-platform model. OCSLA ’78’s range,
instead is as expansive as its environmental/pollution control/ecological goals
require.155 The Fifth Circuit model reflects the imprint of OCSLA ‘53’s concern for
the welfare needs of adjoining state platform workers. The 1978 model leaves these
values in place, but enlarges OCSLA’s scope by encompassing regional ecological
values. The Fifth Circuit model follows OCSLA ‘53’s targeting of a “horizontal” slice
only of the OCS seabed. But an international consensus emerged over the
intervening quarter century favoring national regimes premised on OCSLA ‘78’s
three-dimensional model.156 In consequence, Senator Muskie and his colleagues did
not hesitate to include the OCS airshed as well as OCS submerged lands and the
waters above OCS and state submerged lands in the model.157
These shifts also highlight sec. 1333(a)(1) (2006)’s role both as a law
selection vehicle and OCSLA, including the section itself, as an expanded source of
substantive law for managing blowouts and spills. By confirming OCSLA’s status as a
non-admiralty public lands and pollution control statute, moreover, they render the
Macondo scenario even more remote from the link necessary to satisfy Executive
Jet’s substantial relation test.
A third element is OCSLA ‘78’s addition of an array of environmental
concerns beyond controlling the risks and consequences of OCS blowouts and spills
alone.158 Assaults on DOI leasing decisions under these provisions, usually in
subdivisions. This substitution draws semisubmersibles such as the Deepwater
Horizon directly under OCSLA’s coverage, a result that, given OCSLA’s anti-admiralty
cast, detracts from the claim that OCS operations conducted in conjunction with
semisubmersibles satisfy Executive Jet’s “substantial relationship” test. Since this
amendment also serves as the flywheel driving the title III liability section, among
other functions, it deflates the claim that 43 U.S.C. sec. 1333(a)(1) lacks substantive
effect. See supra Part II.C.1.
155 OCSLA’s coverage of the horizontal seabed and high seas portion of the three
dimensional model derives principally from 43 U.S.C. secs. 1331(a), (e)-(i),
1333(a)(1), and Title III. The vertical air shed cap is specified by 43 U.S.C. sec.
1344(a)(8) (2006), which obligates DOI to comply with the Clean Air Act “to the
extent that activities authorized [by OCSLA] affect the air quality of any State.”
156 Art. 24, Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, T.I.A.S. No.
5200 provides that “every state shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution of the
seas by the discharge of oil from ships or pipelines or results from the exploration
and exploitation of the sea and its subsoil, taking account of existing treaties on the
subject.”
157 See 43 U.S.C. sec. 1344(a)(8) (2006).
158 In addition to the provisions cited in n. 160, an illustrative selection of these
controls or associated provisions includes the gamut of title III provisions addressed
in text, see infra Part III.B.; citizen suits,43 U.S.C. sec. 1349(1) (2006); DOI authority
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conjunction with one or more of such supporting measures as NEPA,159 the Coastal
Zone Management Act,160 the Endangered Species Act161, or the Administrative
Procedure Act,162 witness the breadth of these concerns.163
A fourth element is Congress’s insistence on curbing DOI’s discretion to
override environmental and pollution control values in its leasing decisions. In the
’78 hearing process, OCSLA ‘53 was criticized as an “‘all too general’ piece of
legislation containing few mandates for the Secretary of the Interior.”164 OCSLA ’78,
on the other hand, directs that
the whole outer Continental Shelf process, from preparation of a leasing
program, selection of tracts for leasing, promulgation and enforcement of
regulations, and review of activities must consider environmental
consequences –to the water, to the air, to adjacent coastal areas, and to the
living resources.”165
A final element is Congress’s effort to identify and better coordinate the three
successive phases of OCSLA’s management of the oil cycle: authorization and
regulation of public lands’ leasing, oversight of the leasing program’s environmental
to suspend or terminate oil and gas leases that threaten harm to coastal, marine and
human environments, 43 U.S.C. sec. 1334(a)(1) and (2) (2006); control of the sale
and management of these leases according to a tiered model encompassing
incremental 5-year leasing programs within which individual leases may require
approvals at the exploratory, development, and production stages, 43 U.S.C. secs.
1334, 1340, 1344, and 1351 (2006); coordination of the tiered process with nonOCSLA environmental measures including NEPA environmental assessments, 43
U.S.C. sec. 1351 (2006); Clean Air Act national ambient air standard compliance, 43
U.S.C. sec. 1344(a)(8) (2006); and DOI/coastal state consultations premised on state
recommendations concerning leasing approvals, 43 U.S.C. secs. 1345(c) (2006).
159 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970), at 42 U.S.C. secs. 4321-57 (2006).
160 Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280, at 16
U.S.C. secs. 14561-65 (2006).
161 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) at 16
U.S.C. secs. 1531-43 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
162 Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, secs. 1-12, 60 Stat. 237 (1946),
at 5 U.S.C. 551-559 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
163See, e.g., Tribal Village of Akutan v. Hodel, 859 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1988); Blanco v.
Burton, 2006 WL 2366046 (E.D. La. 2008).
164 H.R. Rep. 95-590, at 12 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450, 1464.
165 Id. at 7. Typical of the many sections that implement this directive, 43 U.S.C. sec.
1344(a)(3) (2006) mandates that the “Secretary shall select the timing and location
of leasing to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a proper balance
between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for the discovery of
oil and gas and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone.”’
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dimensions, and establishment of a legal regime defining both law selection and
substantive legal principles, including among the latter those employed in Title III
and elsewhere to address pollution prevention, civil liability and compensation
issues. The House committee report confirmed OCSLA ‘78’s establishment of wellconsidered links among these formerly disparate or non-existent elements.
No comprehensive national legislation presently exists for responsibility and
liability for the effects of oil pollution resulting from activities on the Shelf.
The purpose of [the bill], by requiring development of an OCS plan,
establishing new management and regulatory requirements, mandating
coordination with affected states, and providing compensation for damages
to fishermen’s gear, for spills and for adverse impacts, is to cure these
defects.166
B. Section 1333(a)(1) and Title III
1. Of “Vessels” and “Offshore Facilities”
The principal if not exclusive ground for admiralty jurisdiction asserted by
parties to the Macondo MDL action is that the Deepwater Horizon exploratory
drilling rig is a “vessel.“ This claim may prevail, assuming that it doesn’t founder on
the rocks of Executive Jet’s substantial relationship test. It entirely possible,
however, that it will fail. In fact, its prospects for success would have been zero in
the period between OCSLA’s amendment in 1978 and OPA’s adoption in 1990.
OPA repealed title III, however, and in OPA section 2701(37) attached the
label “vessel” 167 to semisubmersible drilling rigs (which it also titled as “Mobile
Offshore Drilling Units168 or MODUs). But it also acknowledged that MODUs are
“capable of use as an “offshore facility,” a term that explicity excludes “vessels.”169
OPA includes in this litany the term “Outer Continental Shelf facility,”170 which, if
deemed to have been carried over from or substantially modeled upon OCSLA’s
definition of “offshore facility,”171 undermines the equation of the Deepwater
Horizon with a “vessel.” Where the Deepwater Horizon may end up in this sequence
is addressed in the following subsection.
Temporarily attached drilling rigs typically trigger admiralty jurisdiction
under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A), which, as
the sole predicate for law selection under the Fifth Circuit model, focuses on “fixed
H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at 9 (1977).
“[V]essel means every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance
used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water….”
168 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(18) (2006).
169 33 U.S.C. 2701(22) (2006).
170 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(25) (2006).
171 Title III, sec. 301(8) (1978).
166
167
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structures,” a category deemed to exclude floating rigs.172 But under the Macondo
scenario, as explicitly addressed by the OCSLA ‘78’s pollution control regime, section
1333(a)(1) is the governing provision for law selection and is itself a source of
substantive law in conjunction with other amendments instituting its pollution
control and liability regime.
The House viewed OCSLA title III as providing the “procedures to be followed
in the event of an oil spill and compensation for clean up costs and damages
resulting from such a spill.”173 Title III covers “”spills from any offshore facility in the
OCS” and “any oil tanker, barge or other watercraft which is operating in offshore
areas, and which is carrying oil directly from an offshore facility.”174 The geographic
coverage defined in OCSLA ’78 comports with the statute’s shift to a region-wide
focus.175
OCSLA’s “responsible parties” under title III are the owner/operator of either
the “vessel” or the “offshore facility” which is the source of oil pollution.”176
“Vessels” are limited to watercraft operating in OCS or territorial sea waters and
which are “transporting oil directly from an offshore facility.”177 An “offshore
facility,” on the other hand, is “any oil refinery, drilling structure, oil storage or
transfer terminal, or pipeline, or any appurtenance related to any of the foregoing,
which is used to drill for, produce, store, handle, transfer, process, or transport oil

See, e.g., Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F. 2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1966); Walsh
v. Seagull Energy Corp, 836 F. Supp. 411, 414, 416 (S.D. Tex. 1993); In re Sedco, 543
F. Supp. 561, 571-72 (D.C. Tex. 1982); cf. Stewart v. Dutra, 543 U.S. 481, 489-92
(2005). But see EEX Corp. v . ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. 161 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751(S.D. Tex.
2001)(“[A] vessel ceases to be a vessel the moment it attaches itself to the Shelf”).
173 H.R. Rep. 95-1474, at 52, 1978 (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674,
1725.
174 Id.
175 Title III, Sec. 304(a) (1978) declares that “[o]il pollution” comprehends the
“unlawful“ discharge of oil in the waters above submerged lands seaward from the
coastline of a State” or “on the adjacent shoreline of such a State” or “on the waters
of the contiguous zone,” or the “presence of oil in or on the waters of the high seas
outside the territorial limits of the United States … when discharged in connection
with activities conducted under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Shelf Lands Act.”
This section adds the “slice” of waters above the OCS seabed to the “horizontal”
regime of the 1953 OCSLA, which included only the OCS’s subsoil, seabed and
natural resources. See supra Part II.A. The final slice is the airshed above these
waters, which DOI is required to regulate for Clean Air Act purposes under OCSLA
43 U.S.C. sec. 1334(a)(8) (2006).
176 Title III, sec. 304(a) (1978).
177 Title III, sec. 301(5) (1978) (emphasis added).
172
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produced from the Outer Continental Shelf …, and is located on the Outer
Continental Shelf, except that such term does not include … a vessel ….”178
A straightforward reading of these definitions excludes semisubmersibles as
“vessels,” by including them under “any drilling structure.” The term “vessel” is
restricted to watercraft used exclusively to “[transport] oil directly from an offshore
facility.” Hence, the statement of the conferees:
Vessels are separately defined and are separately treated under [title III].
However, once a drilling ship or other watercraft is attached to the seabed for
exploration, development or production, it is to be considered an “offshore
facility” rather than a vessel for purposes of applying the differing
requirements for a facility as compared with a vessel.179
But the basis for placing “drilling ships” within the “facility” and “offshore
facility” categories is of far greater moment for this paper’s purposes. It is one and
the same with that supporting Congress’s choice to strike the phrase “fixed
structures” from section 1333(a)(1), and insert the phrase “and all installations and
other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed.” Red Adair, the oil
and gas industry’s premier blowout fireman, confirmed before the Ad Hoc Select
Committee that semi-submersibles, which conduct exploration drilling, are more
“dangerous” than production platforms, the fixed (production) structures of section
1333(a)(2)(A).180 Reflecting the variety and frequency of and public outrage over
Title III, 301(8) (1978) (emphasis added). A “facility” is a “structure, or group of
structures (other than a vessel or vessels), used for the purpose of transporting,
drilling for, producing, processing, storing, transferring, or otherwise handling oil.”
Title III, sec. 301(7) (1978).
179 H.R. Rep. 95-590, at 117 (1977) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1450, 1585. To like effect is the passage immediately following the quote in text:
[“The term ‘vessel’ covers] every description of watercraft or other contrivance,
whether or not self-propelled, which is used to transport oil directly from an offshore
facility. Once a vessel is operating in the navigable waters of the United States [i.e.,
landward from the OCS], it is not included in the title.” Id.at 118. (emphasis added).
The special attention accorded vessels engaged in the transport of oil from offshore
facilities likely reflects Congress’s agreement with then-Secretary of the Interior
Andrus, who testified that these vessels are the “most dangerous things we have in
the whole petroleum cycle.” Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1977,
Part II: Hearings on H.R. 1614 before the Ad Hoc Select Committee on Outer
Continental Shelf, 95th Cong. 1587 (1977)(Statement of Cecil D. Andrus, Secretary,
Department of the Interior).
180 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1977, Part II: Hearings on H.R.
1614 Before the Ad hoc Select Committee on Outer Continental Shelf, 95th Cong. 875915 (1977) (response of Paul “Red’ Adair, Red Adair Oil Well Fires and Blowouts
Control Co., Houston, TX to sequence of committee questions probing, inter alia, the
178
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the scores of events from the 1969 Santa Barbara blowout to the most recent vessel
spill, the Ad Hoc Select Committee explained the amendment’s purpose as follows:
Section (a) amends section 4(a)(1) of the OCS Act of 1953 [now section
1333(a)(1)] by changing the term ‘fixed structures‘ to ‘and all installations
and other devices permanently or temporarily attached to the seabed‘ and
making other technical changes. It is thus made clear that federal law is to be
applicable to all activities on all devices in contact with the seabed for
exploration, development, and production. The committee intends that federal
law is, therefore, to be applicable to activities on drilling ships, semisubmersible drilling rigs, and other watercraft, when they are connected to the
seabed by drill string, pipes, or other appurtenances, on the OCS for
exploration, development, or production purposes. Ships and vessels are
specifically not covered when they are being used for the purpose of
transporting OCS mineral resources.181
2. The Gusher Issue and OCSLA ‘78
The Gusher Issue was dormant under OCSLA ’53 in light of the latter’s
narrow focus on events occurring atop fixed structures. But it comes directly into
play under OCSLA ‘78’s amendment adopting a regional orientation to encompass
the prevention and policing of blowouts and oil spills. Does OCSLA ’78 extend its
coverage to the Macondo oil and blowout’s effects beyond these situses? In an action
seeking to establish liability for a maritime pollution incident’s economic losses,
does it override the superadjacent water’s former status as an admiralty location?
The Oppen decisions’ response to these queries was negative, but OCSLA ’78 calls for
a different answer.
Congress’s authority to control OCSLA public lands and the oil is beyond
question. Kleppe v. New Mexico182 ruled both that Congress’s property clause powers
are “essentially limitless,”183 and that “Congress exercises the powers both of a
proprietor and of a legislator over the public domain.”184 Kleppe sustained a federal
statute protecting wild horses and burros on public lands against a state challenge
asserting, inter alia, that public lands do not include their associated resources –in
this case the wild animals.185 The analogy to OCSLA lands and the oil deriving from
comparative danger of blowouts from semisubmersible vs. permanent platform
drilling structures).
181 H.R. Rep. No. 95-590, at p. 68 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.1450, 1534
(capitalization by author).
182 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
182 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
183 Id. at 539 (quoting United States v. County and City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,
29 (1940)).
184 Id. at 540.
185 Id. at 537.
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them is plain, although Macondo presents an even stronger case because the OCS,
unlike New Mexico, is an exclusive federal enclave in which concurrent state
legislation (not functioning as surrogate federal law) is barred.
But what about the claim of OCSLA’s continued control of the oil and
activities associated with its policing once the oil leaves its original 53 ‘OCSLA sites?
This issue is addressed in the now-classic Minnesota v. Block decision,186 which
rejected a state challenge to Congress’s powers to control activities on state-owned
areas in the context of a federal statute regulating and in some cases barring
motorized recreational vehicles on state-owned portions of a national wilderness
area. Block upheld the federal statute: “Congress’ power must extend to the
regulation of conduct on or off the public lands that would threaten the designated
purpose of federal lands.”187 It also applied a deferential standard to test the
reasonableness of the controls adopted by Congress for this purpose.188
OCSLA ‘78’s legislative history confirms that its environmental controls,
which are largely premised on the regional model, were adopted to minimize state
and public objections to OCS drilling. Law suits, drilling moratoria and hostile public
response overall to the drilling’s environmental consequences severely constrained
OCSLA oil production to the detriment of the national economy, national defense
and national revenues. Congress sought to overcome this hostility by means of
OCSLA’s 78 amendments, an illustrative provision of which states that “operations
on the outer Continental Shelf should be conducted in a safe manner… to prevent or
minimize the likelihood of blowouts, loss of well control, fire …or other occurrences
which may cause damage to the environment or to property, or endanger life or
health.”189 The effort to overcome these objections through such environmental
assurances and the civil sanctions of OSLA 78’s “new statutory regime” fully
comport with Block’s requirement of regulating conduct “off the public land that
would threaten the designated purpose of [these] federal lands.”190
The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged these values in decisions sustaining
OCSLA jurisdiction under section 1349(b)(1) against objections that the activities in
the pertinent dispute failed to arise out of “any operation” related to oil production
on the OCS. Its leading decision upheld OCSLA jurisdiction to hear a suit concerning
the “take-or-pay” and “minimum-take’ provisions of a natural gas sales contract. 191
The court upheld jurisdiction, reasoning that
660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
187 Id. at 1249.
188 Id. at 1250 (“In reviewing the appropriateness of federal regulations…
‘determinations under the Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment
of Congress.’”) (quoting Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 536).
189 43 U.S.C. sec. 1332(6) (2006).
190 Block, 660 F.2d at 1249.
191 Amoco Prod’n Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 844 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1988).
186
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[t]he efficient exploitation of the minerals of the OCS, owned exclusively by
the United States, was a primary reason for OCSLA. Just as clearly, any
dispute that alters the progress of production activities on the OCS threatens
to impair the total recovery of the federally owned minerals from the
reservoir … underlying the OCS.192
The court interpreted key OCSLA language in a manner designed to “effectuate the
congressional grant of jurisdiction where that would enhance or achieve control of
the natural resources by the national government.”193
3. The Fifth Circuit and Macondo Models under OCSLA ‘78
This review of the OCSLA ’78 program supports this paper’s major themes.
Congress’s exclusion of semisubmersibles from the OCSLA “vessel” category
demonstrates that whether a watercraft is a “vessel” depends entirely upon the
context and statute, if any, in issue. The status of Dutra’s “Super Scoop” barge in
Boston Harbor under the LHWCA or Grubart’s spud barge on the Chicago River
under general maritime law,194 therefore, in no way controls the status of the
Deepwater Horizon atop the Gulf’s OCS under OCSLA or OPA. It merely commences
what turns out to be a complex and, as the next section will reveal, very uncertain
inquiry. Section 1333(a)(1), not section 1333(a)(2)(A), moreover, selects the
pertinent law when federal non-admiralty statutes govern OCS operations, as OCSLA
and its companion, OPA obviously do in the Macondo setting. Nor is federal law
selection 1333(a)(1)’s sole function. The section also provides the flywheel driving
OCSLA’s ‘78’s environmental and oil discharge liability program, and, as such, is a
component of the substantive federal law selected. Finally, unlike OCSLA-endorsed
state law under section 1333(a)(2)(A), OCSLA’s federal law selections are immune
from displacement by general maritime law.
C. Scorecard: OCSLA Phase II
Rodney Dangerfield Issue: Dangerfield becomes Seinfeld. OCSLA section
1333(a)(1) comes into its own both as a selector of the applicable federal statutes
OCSLA and OPA, and as itself a source of substantive law through its inclusion of
“temporarily attached” drilling platforms and its links to title III as well as to other
OCSLA ‘78 provisions addressing OCSLA’s public lands and environmental advances.
Id. at 1210
Id. at 1209, n. 25. In another opinion upholding OCSLA sec. 1349(1)(b)
jurisdiction for the partition of co-owned OCS pipeline infrastructure, the Circuit
stated that “resolution of these ownership rights would affect the efficient
exploitation of resources from the OCS and/or threaten the total recovery of
federally-owned resources.” E.P. Operating Ltd. Partn’s’p v. Placid Oil Co., 21 F.3rd
563, 570 (5th Cir. 1994).
194 See Grubart at 555 (1995) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
192
193
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Talisman Issue: OCSLA ’78 defines away the Deepwater Horizon’s status as a
a “vessel” for admiralty purposes. It is instead an OCS-located “offshore facility”
because it functioned as an exploratory drilling platform when its drill string was
attached to the Macondo well below.195 In the Lewis Carroll world of conventional,
rather than ontological meaning, a mobile watercraft can morph into an “offshore
facility” for law selection purposes, and indisputably has done so in OCSLA ’78.
Gusher Issue: Both the international community’s 1958 approval of the
Convention on the Law of the Sea and Congress’s adoption of the regional ecological
model negate Oppen’s conclusion that a blowout or spill commencing on an OCS
situs becomes an admiralty tort once the discharge makes contact with
superadjacent water. In obligating rather than simply permitting the littoral nation
to adopt sanitary and pollution regulations for waters above its OCS region, article
24 eliminated the concern earlier voiced by OCSLA ’53’s drafters that such measures
would serve as a pretext for encroaching upon waters’ navigation or fishing
freedoms. Kleppe and Block validate Congress’s authority under the Property Clause
to regulate public lands and contiguous areas in this manner. The anti-admiralty
outcome of the Gusher Issue is fully in accord with the Supreme Court’s declaration
in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire that “admiralty jurisdiction generally should
not be extended to accidents in areas covered by OCSLA.”196
Alien Issue: Scoring this issue is reserved for Phase III and the Conclusion.
IV. OCSLA PHASE III: Post-OPA ‘90
A. Deepwater Horizon: A “Vessel” for post-OPA ‘90?
Congress’s concurrent adoption of OPA and repeal of OCSLA title III in 1990
while retaining OCSLA’s regional focus and its coverage of “temporarily attached”
devices fog over a formerly clear picture, leaving pervasive uncertainty cutting both
for and against admiralty jurisdiction. Arguably favoring this status for the
Deepwater Horizon are three elements. One is OPA’s adoption of a definition for
“vessel” that codifies the general maritime law concept.197 While debating OCSLA’s
See EEX Corp. v. ABB Vetco Gray, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 747, 751 (S.D. Tex. 2001), which
observed that OCSLA ‘78’s shift to include vessels attached to the sea floor afforded OCSLA
jurisdiction for the case at bar. The Court opined that “under the Shelf Act, a vessel ceases
to be a vessel the moment it attaches itself to the Shelf; it has become a tiny federal enclave
not governed by international admiralty law.” Id. at 751 (citing Rodrigue, among other
precedents).
196 477 U.S. 207, 218 (1985) (emphasis added). The area “covered by” OCSLA ’78 for
environmental purposes, of course, is broader than the area “covered by” OCSLA ’53
for platform worker injuries, Tallentire’s issue.
197 The House and Senate conferees agreed that OPA 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(37)’s
definition of “vessel” is restated verbatim “from [current FWPCA section 1321(a)]”
195
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’78 amendments, moreover, Congress was aware that an-OPA type bill was also
underway, and expressly reserved freedom for itself to shape this eventual measure
in whatever fashion it wished.198 Finally, this same narrative bars an interpretation
of OCSLA ’78 that modifies admiralty jurisdiction, rules or incidents.199
But a contrary understanding of Congress’s concurrent adoption of OPA ‘90
and repeal of title III is no less plausible. Having both committed itself so
energetically to include “temporarily attached” watercraft as a substantive
component of section 1333(a)(1) and left this language intact in 1990, it would
seem anomalous for Congress abruptly to reverse course without explanation. Not
only had Congress been instructed by Red Adair during the OCSLA ’78 hearings of
the greater dangers posed by exploratory mobile platforms over fixed production
platforms, 200 but Senators Chaffee, Lieberman, Durenberger and Graham appended
a separate statement to the Senate’s 1990 OPA report201 emphasizing that well
blowouts threaten discharges of far greater quantity than vessels. The subsequent
Senate provision, which was enacted as OPA section 2703(c)(3), uncapped the
liability of what OPA would term “Outer Continental Shelf offshore facilities.”202
While the 1978 Congress denied an intent to bind its successors in fashioning
future oil pollution legislation, neither did it urge that a subsequent Congress
disown OCSLA ’78’s classification of semisubmersible or other mobile off-shore
drilling units. On the contrary there is no evidence of Congress’s hostility to this
classification; its retention of section 1333(a)(1)’s “temporarily attached” devices, of
course, points in the contrary direction. What Congress sought, instead, was
as are the terms “onshore facility” and “offshore facility.” H.R. Rep. No.101-653, at 2
(1990) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779.
198 The conferees agreed that they “‘do not in any way intend by the adoption of this
title to affect consideration of, or approval of, any language in a comprehensive oil
spill act…. The conferees expect that this title would be abrogated by the passage
and enactment of such a comprehensive bill.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1474, at 677 (1978)
(Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1674, 1739.
199 The conferees clarified that it was not their intent “to change the jurisdiction in
incidents that are within the admiralty and maritime laws of the United States.” H.R.
Rep. No. 101-653, at 58 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 779, 838.
200 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
201 See S. Rep. 101-94, at 26 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 74849 (separate statement of Senators Chaffee, Lieberman, Durenberger, and
Graham). The senators warned that “[v]essels –even extremely large ones
such as the Amoco Cadiz and the Exxon Valdez—carry finite supplies of oil
and usually only a portion of the cargo is lost because it is
compartmentalized…. [But] OCS [blowouts] … can involve prodigious and
seemingly unlimited quantities of crude oil. The size of such spills can be
enough to fill hundreds or even thousands of tankers the size of the Exxon
Valdez.” Id.
202 See 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(25) (2006)
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consolidating within OPA the components of four separate maritime pollution
statutes-- OCSLA, FWPCA sec. 311, the Deepwater Port Act203 and the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act.204 Consolidation was designed to insure standardization
of response cost and damages liability, and reduction of the inefficiencies of
networking among multiple agencies, each interpreting separate statutes,
formulating separate regulations and administering separate oil spill trust funds.205
The conferees’ agreement that OPA does not modify admiralty jurisdiction or
incidents is relevant only if the Macondo’s status as an admiralty tort post-OCSLA
‘78 is conceded. But this is the very question being posed in these paragraphs.
Turning to OPA’s text for further direction, three OPA terms stand out:
“mobile offshore drilling unit” (MODU); “offshore facility,” and “Outer Continental
Shelf offshore facility.” OPA section 2701(18) defines “mobile offshore drilling unit”
(MODU), the only definition that unassailably applies to the Deepwater Horizon
because the rig, a semi-submersible, qualifies as a MODU. But is a MODU a “vessel”?
Yes and no: the answer depends upon how the MODU is being used. As defined in
section 2701(18), a MODU is categorized either as a “vessel,” or as “capable of use”
as an “offshore facility.” But OPA section 2701(22) defines an “offshore facility,” the
second definitional term, as “any facility of any kind located in, on or under any of
the navigable waters of the United States… other than a “vessel.” Likewise excluding
MODUs (when used as offshore facilities) from classification as vessels is OCSLA sec.
1333(a)(1), which includes them within its “temporarily attached” device group. To
like effect are the Coast Guard’s navigational aid regulations, which include MODUs
as “structures” which are defined to include “fixed structures, temporary or
permanent ,” a category that encompasses “mobile offshore drilling units (MODUs)
when attached to the [OCS] bottom.” 206
OPA’s third term, section 2701(25)’s “Outer Continental Shelf facility,” cannot
be overlooked because it is one of only two OPA title I provisions207 that even
mention the OCS. It is defined as “an offshore facility which is located … on the Outer
Continental Shelf and is or was used for any of the following purposes : exploring
Deepwater Port Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-6278, 88 Stat. 2126 (1975), at 33
U.S.C. secs. 1501-24 (2006).
204 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L., No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 584 (1973),
at 43 U.S.C. secs. 1651 et. seq. (2006).
205 The Senate Report observed that the existing oil spill programs “provide varying
and uneven liability standards and scope of coverage for clean-up costs and
damages associated with activities covered by each individual law. Moreover, the
array of …programs can create administrative problems as well. As a result the goal
of compensating those injured may be complicated by questions of the jurisdiction
of various federal agencies.” Senate Report 101-94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 725.
206 See U.S. Coast Guard, AIDS to Navigation on Artificial Islands and Fixed
Structures, 33 C.F.R. sec. 67-01-5 (2004).
207 33 U.S.C. sec. 2704(c)(3)(2006) is the other.
203
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for, drilling for, producing … or transporting oil produced from the Outer
Continental Shelf.” Striking verbal parallels link this characterization to former
OCSLA title III sec, 301(8)’s term “offshore facility,” which is also identified as a
“drilling structure … used to drill for, produce … or transport oil produced from the
Outer Continental Shelf.”208 But the OCSLA offshore facility encompasses watercraft
used as drilling platforms so long as they do not transport oil from OCS offshore
facilities. OPA’s “Outer Continental Shelf facility,” in contrast, excludes “vessels” as
defined in 33 U.S.C. sec. 2701(18) (2006).
There is, however, a further wrinkle. In supporting the view expressed by the
four senators negating a cap on response costs for OCS operations, OPA sec.
2703(c)(3) duplicates the parallelism of OPA “Outer Continental Shelf offshore
facilities” with OCSLA “offshore facilities.” It divides into mutually exclusive
categories the (OPA) “ Outer Continental Shelf facility” from “a vessel carrying oil as
cargo from such a facility,” the latter of which, of course, rules the Deepwater
Horizon out as a “vessel.” Reinforcing the interpretation that OCS facilities and
vessels are mutually exclusive categories are Coast Guard regulations that define the
term “Outer Continental Shelf facility” as
[a]ny artificial island, installation or other device permanently or temporarily
attached to the subsoil or seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf, erected for
the purpose of exploring for, developing, or producing resources therefrom,
or any such installation or other device (other than a ship or vessel) for the
purpose of transporting for such resources.. The term includes mobile offshore
drilling units when in contact with the seabed of the OCS for exploration or
exploitation of subsea resources.209
Only two confident conclusions can be drawn from this definitional labryinth,
neither of which aids the inquiry. First, Congress has not clarified the extent to
which its denial of admiralty jurisdiction for “temporarily attached” drilling
platforms in OCSLA ’78 survives or perishes in consequence of title III’s repeal by
OPA ’90. Resolving the confusion should be a first order of business in the postMacondo blowout restructuring of OCSLA and OPA called for by the Presidential
Commission.210 Second, the eventual resolution of the issue for the Macondo dispute
will confirm the accuracy of John Chipman Gray’s observation that “statutes do not
interpret themselves; their meaning is declared by the courts, and it is with this
meaning … that they are imposed upon the community as Law.”211
Title III, sec. 301(8) (1978) (emphasis added). A “facility” is a “structure, or
group of structures (other than a vessel or vessels), used for the purpose of
transporting, drilling for, producing, processing, storing, transferring, or otherwise
handling oil.” Id. at sec. 301(7).
209 See U.S. Coast Guard OCS Activities, Subpart A, sec. 140.10 (2004) (emphasis
added).
210 President’s Report, Part III: Lessons Learned.
211 The Nature and Sources of the Law 170 (Gaunt Reprint 1999) (1909).
208
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B . From Rodrigue to Executive Jet to Grubart: The Fusion of OCSLA and
Admiralty Analysis
1. From Executive Jet to Grubart
Executive Jet has been followed to date by three further opinions refining the
substantial relationship principle. The first, Foremost Insurance Company v.
Richardson,212 extended Executive Jet to vessels, announcing that only those
maritime torts involving vessels in navigable waters that satisfy the Executive Jet
test under circumstances threatening disruption of maritime commerce qualify as
maritime torts.213 Hence, even if the Deepwater Horizon were a “vessel” and the
discharge of its oil into the OCS’s subjacent waters were a tort, admiralty
jurisdiction would not apply unless the semisubmersible’s activity, OCS exploratory
operations, satisfies the test.
This point is lost on those who conflate the independent requirements of
location and of the substantial relationship link when they insist that ocean drilling
conducted from a vessel engages admiralty jurisdiction.214 The ocean and vessel
elements address location; the fact that drilling is conducted from an ocean vessel
does not, by itself, establish compliance with the substantial relation test. The latter
is not satisfied unless exploitation of OCS resources through exploration,
development or production bears the requisite link to a traditional maritime
activity.
The second post-Executive Jet decision, Sisson v. Ruby,215 essentially
recapitulates the former two opinions to require, in addition to the locational
requirements of vessel and waters, that the general features of the incident causing
the harm must threaten to disrupt maritime commerce, and that the general
character of the activity from which the incident arose must show a substantial
relation to a traditional maritime activity. Grubart, the last of the Executive Jet line to
date, confirms the application of these principles, describing the relational test met
457 U.S. 668 (1982).
Id. at 675.
214 Hence, Grubart’s observation that “[b]ecause the injuries suffered by Grubart and
the other flood victims were caused by a vessel on navigable water, the location
enquiry would seem to be at an end …” Grubart at 535 (emphasis added). The opinion
then addresses the substantial relationship test as a separate issue. Id. at 538-48.
Illustrative of the distinction is the Fifth Circuit’s own opinion in AmClyde, discussed
infra Part IV B.2. in which a tortious event occurring on one and, arguably two,
vessels on high seas and extending to a partially constructed fixed drilling platform
above the OCS was deemed to fall short of admiralty jurisdiction because the OCS
“operation” being pursued in the event was found not to be “substantially related to
a traditional maritime activity.”
215 497 U.S. 358 (1990)
212
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when “the tortfeasor’s activity … on navigable waters is so closely related to activity
traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty
rules would apply in the suit at hand.”216 The Court also observed that if the incident
features multiple parties as tortfeasors, admiralty jurisdiction is secured so long as
the activity of one party meets the relational test and is the incident’s proximate
cause.217
Earlier discussion of the Oppen decisions following the Santa Barbara OCS
blowout observed that they were outdated in two respects that can now be
addressed. Their view that the activity to be connected to the traditional maritime
activity is that of the damaged party rather than of the tortfeasor218 is clearly at
odds with the Court’s four decisions. Likewise erroneous is their position on the
Gusher Issue that movement of the oil from the OCS floor into the waters above
transformed the blowout into a general maritime event. This position fails upon
OCSLA ’78’s adoption, which enlarged OCSLA’s venue for environmental and civil
liability purposes from platforms themselves to the contiguous region.219
Turning to Grubart’s requirements overall, a forceful claim can be made that
The Macondo blowout satisfies only the disruption of maritime commerce element.
the blowout, of course, not only threatened to but actually did disrupt maritime
commerce. But the impediments to classifying the Deepwater Horizon as a “vessel”
are imposing, as evidenced throughout this paper. An even greater struggle is
undoubtedly in the offing should the Supreme Court be asked to rule on Grubart’s
requirement that the “general character of the activity giving rise to the incident”220
–exploratory drilling for oil and gas on the OCS—is “so closely related to activity
traditionally subject to admiralty law that the reasons for applying special admiralty
rules would apply in the suit at hand.”221
Two considerations explain why a struggle is likely for an inquiry that is
unconstrained by the Fifth Circuit’s OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) jurisprudence.
The first is the combination of both Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s dour view
of the supposed maritime character of OCS drilling. Macondo may provide the
scenario through which, ironically, the OCSLA-based tug of war between the
Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit finds its resolution within Executive Jet’s
admiralty-limiting venue. The second is that Macondo differs from the Court’s four
“substantial relationship” cases in relation to the consideration most likely to
Grubart at 539-40 (emphasis added.)
In Macondo, BP does not satisfy this requirement because its well is an OCSLA
situs and because the Gusher Issue resolves against admiralty jurisdiction.
Consequently, the focus throughout this paper has been on the Deepwater Horizon.
218 See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1974); Oppen v. Aetna Ins.
Co, 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 1973).
219 See infra Part III.B.2.
220 Grubart at 539
221 Id. at 539-40.
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determine the inquiry’s outcome: namely, that Congress itself has essentially
prepackaged the factual and policy grounds upon which a negative decision should
rest. The burden of sustaining this endeavor will not fall upon the judiciary alone,
therefore, as it has in the Court’s four preceding struggles with the inquiry.
Concisely and authoritatively, Congress has framed the Grubart-required
description of the “general character of the activity giving rise to the incident“222 by
its half-century of deliberations on OCSLA ’53 through OCSLA ’90, followed by 16
years of similar deliberations leading to OPA. This process has distilled a consistent,
logical and fully transparent conception of OCS drilling operations as Macondo’s
underlying activity. The description is one and the same with OCSLA section
1349(b)(1)’s definition of the basis for OCSLA subject matter jurisdiction: namely,
“any operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration,
development or production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the outer
Continental Shelf.” This definition mirrors, in turn, OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s
targeting of activities undertaken “for the purpose of exploring for, developing, or
producing resources [from the OCS seabed],” as further delimited by OCSLA section
1331’s specification of the terms “exploration,” “development,” and “production”
respectively.223
My omission of section 1333(a)(1)’s “temporarily attached” devices and of
section 1333(a)(2)(A)’s “fixed structures” is deliberate because the substantial
relationship test focuses on the activity being conducted by the Deepwater Horizon,
not on whether this exploratory oil drilling rig merits classification as temporarily
attached or fixed.224
Id.
43 U.S.C. secs. 1331(k) (exploration), (l) (development), and (m) (production),
respectively.
224 Not only has Congress provided this definitive characterization, but the Macondo
MDL proceedings have already yielded a determination that the Macondo blowout
does indeed fall within these parameters as expressed in OCSLA 43 U.S.C. sec.
1349(b)(1) (2006) and supplemented in Fifth Circuit jurisprudence. See In re Oil
Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” MDL No. 2179, 747 F.Supp.2d 704 (E.D. La.
2010) (Barbier, J.).
Declining to remand to state court an action BP had removed to the Eastern District
of Louisiana, Judge Barbier ruled that the Macondo incident accorded with the
section because it was an “operation conducted on the outer Continental Shelf,
which involved the exploration and production of minerals.” Id. at 709. He added
that the Circuit has clarified that “[t]hese terms denote respectively the processes
involved in searching for minerals on the OCS; preparing to extract them by, inter
alia, drilling wells and constructing platforms; and removing the minerals and
transferring them to shore.” Id. (citing Tennessee Gas Pipeline v. Houston Cas. Ins.
Co., 87 F.3rd 150, 154 (5th Cir. 1996)). All that remains to complete the picture is to
conclude that OCSLA not only provides jurisdiction for the dispute, but also specifies
the governing law, in accordance not only with the reasoning set forth supra Part
222
223
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2. AmClyde: From Executive Jet/Grubart back to OCSLA/Rodrigue
The functional linkage of Rodrigue to Executive Jet was earlier identified in a
passage suggesting that the OCSLA’s liberation from the Fifth Circuit’s “of its own
force” and “other Federal laws” devices might render it even more potent than had
the Fifth Circuit accorded the statute the standing that it concedes OCSLA’s
legislative history warrants.225 Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc. v. AmClyde
Engineered Products Company 226 (AmClyde) illustrates this scenario. If fused with
section 1333(a)(2)(A), the Executive Jet/Grubart test renders the OCSLA-endorsed
state law candidate a well-armored admiralty opponent .
Union Texas Petroleum Corp. v. PLT Engineering Corp.227 (UTP) routinized the
section 1333(a)(2)(A) exercise as a three-step process. It favors OCSLA’s preference
over admiralty jurisdiction and law selection only upon demonstration of an OCSLA
situs (Step 1), the non-application of admiralty law of its own force (Step 2), and the
consistency of the OCSLA-endorsed state law with “other Federal laws.” (Step 3).
Independent of OCSLA, on the other hand, admiralty law will not apply absent
demonstration of the Executive Jet/ Grubart relationship linkage.
How might the Fifth Circuit universe change if the Executive Jet/Grubart test
were substituted for the former Step 2? AmClyde instructs that it would change in
two significant respects: namely, that the “of its own force” and “other Federal laws”
dodges would not overcome OCSLA, and that the presence of a vessel in the
situational mix would not, of itself, support admiralty jurisdiction.
AmClyde was a combined negligence/products liability action brought by
Texaco against a variety of defendants including AmClyde Engineeering, the
successor to a company that designed the main load line of a crane that failed,
II.C.1, but as also expressed in EP Operating Ltd. Ptns’p v. Placid Oil Co., 26 F.3rd 563,
570 (5th Cir. 1994). “OCSLA casts a broad substantive net in section 1333,” and
“instructs that ‘the jurisdictional grant of section 1349 should be read co-extensively
reach of section 1333.’” Id. at 569 (emphasis added). Since it is beyond question that
the federal statutes, OCSLA and OPA afford the applicable law for the economic
losses occasioned by the Macondo dispute, the complications posed elsewhere by
OCSLA section 1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) arise, if at all, only in conjunction with the
“mini-gap” issue posed supra Part II.E.
225 See supra TAN 72.
226 Texaco Explor’n & Prod’n Inc . v. AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., 448 F.3 rd
760, 770-71 (5th Cir. 2006), amended on rehearing, Texaco Explor’n & Prod’n Inc v.
AmClyde Engineered Prods. Co., Inc., 453 F.3rd 652 (5th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
AmClyde Engineered Products Co., Inc. v. Texaco Explor’n and Prod’n, Inc., 549 U.S.
1053 (2006) [hereinafter AmClyde].
227 895 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 848 (1990).
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plunging into the sea a deck module being fitted to the support frame of a partially
constructed, fixed oil production platform. Two vessels were featured at least as
prominently featured in this tort as the Deepwater Horizon was in the Macondo
blowout. One was the materials barge from which the derrick crane lifted the deck
module. The other was the DB-50, the barge on which the crane was positioned and
from which it had to swing the deck module some 1500 feet to reach the platform
site.
The court rebuffed an admiralty-based challenge to OCSLA jurisdiction. It
observed that the project’s purpose –constructing a facility that would conduct OCS
drilling production activities-- aligned squarely with an OCSLA “operation” under
OCSLA section 1349(b)(1). It then held that admiralty jurisdiction was not
supported by dispute’s facts. “To the extent that maritime activities surround the
construction work underlying the complaint,” the court stated, “any connection to
maritime law is eclipsed by the construction’s connection to the development of the
Outer Continental Shelf.228
The court then turned to the law selection exercise under section
1333(a)(2)(A), utilizing the UTP three-step test for this task. It quickly affirmed the
dispute’s compliance with Step 1 on the basis that that the permanent platform
qualified as an OCSLA situs.
Under conventional 1333(a)(2)(A), analysis, virtual givens in light of the
presence of the dispute’s two vessels were Step Two’s findings of concurrent
admiralty jurisdiction followed by overlapping OCSLA and admiralty jurisdiction,
and completed by admiralty’s rout of OCSLA on grounds of jurisdictional overlap
and of the “other Federal laws” and “of its own force” devices. Instead, the court
upset these well-settled expectations by opting to substitute for conventional
analysis a fusion of Executive Jet/Grubart with Rodrigue /OCSLA. Negating admiralty
law’s selection, the court stated that “[t]he DB-50’s involvement in the accident and
other elements of maritime activity that proceed or surround the [platform’s]
construction on the Shelf are insufficient to support either admiralty jurisdiction or
the application of substantive maritime law.”229 It declared the back door closed to
admiralty law: “maritime law cannot apply of its own force because there is an
insufficient connection between the underlying tort and traditional maritime
activity.”230
Macondo does not need AmClyde to credibly challenge admiralty jurisdiction
as inappropriate under Executive Jet grounds. But a comparison of the two scenarios
is provocative nonetheless because they are united by striking factual similarities.
Both present watercraft in prominent roles: AmClyde features a materials barge, and
the DB-50, a derrick barge. Macondo has the Deepwater Horizon. Both have
AmClyde at 771.
Id. at 775.
230 Id. at 774.
228
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undoubted OCSLA situses: AmClyde’s fixed platform and Macondo’s OCSLA subsoil
and seabed oil and gas well. And both are pursuing the same OCS “operation”:
exploitation of the OCS for oil production. There are, of course, differences between
two that distance Macondo even further from admiralty than AmClyde. Macondo
engages predominantly federal statutes –OCSLA and OPA -- not the OCSLA-endorsed
state law on which Texaco relied. Conceding the Deepwater Horizon’s not
insignificant role in Macondo, the DB-50 was even more prominent in the AmClyde
tort as the situs upon which the attached derrick crane failed. Conversely, the
Macondo well merits top billing over the Deepwater Horizon. The well generated 4.9
million barrels of oil and its blowout caused the Deepwater Horizon’s incineration
and discharge of a mere six/ten thousandths of the total amount of the event’s oil.
C. Scorecard: OCSLA Phase III (Post-1990)
Rodney Dangerfield Issue: OCSLA section 1333(a)(1)’s standing with respect
to the selection and application of federal law remains unchanged. Likewise
unchanged is its inclusion of “temporarily attached” drilling platforms. But whether
this language will have the same or similar force in conjunction with OPA (either
directly or as an interpretational aid for the latter) as it enjoyed in conjunction with
former title III is unclear. Even if it does not, however, the continued vigor of the
section’s “temporarily attached” language counts against the conclusion that the
Macondo tort satisfies Executive Jet’s (non-OCSLA) substantial relationship criterion.
Talisman Issue: The outcome of this issue will likely depend upon how the
judiciary regards the plasticity of terms such as MODU, which may connote a
“vessel” pure and simple or which, when “use[d] as an offshore facility” assumes the
character of the latter. Also influential will be whether OPA sec. 2703(c)(3)’s
dichotomy between an ”Outer Continental Shelf facility” and a “vessel carrying oil as
cargo from such a facility” is deemed to replicate OCSLA’s definition of an “offshore
facility” which clearly includes semisubmersibles like the Deepwater Horizon, but
excluded oil-transporting vessels. Nor can Section 1333(a)(1)’s “temporarily
attached” language be disregarded on the faulty premise that OPA has repealed it by
implication in the same measure –OPA--that Congress employed expressly to repeal
title III. It remains to be seen whether Amclyde’s dismissal of the materials and DB50 barges as background noise will be honored in future Fifth Circuit decisions.
AmClyde does demonstrate, however, both Executive Jet’s power to trump the Fifth
Circuit’s conventional section 1333(a)(2)(A) analysis within the familiar UTP 3-step
format, and the distinction between its test’s locational (vessel/navigable waters)
and purpose (link of the venture underlying the tort with a “traditional maritime
activity”) components.
Gusher Issue: OPA does not supplant OCSLA’s non-repealed provisions
framing its regional environmental framework. The Gusher Issue’s status continues,
therefore, as stated in the 1978 Scorecard. The Oppen opinions’ contrary position
should not prevail.
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Alien Issue: The preceding observations regarding the challenges Macondo
faces satisfying the substantial relationship test caution that the latter will prove
even more threatening to admiralty jurisdiction than the Deepwater Horizon’s
status as an “Outer Continental Shelf offshore facility.” In combination, the two
objections will prove formidable, perhaps even insuperable.
V. Conclusion
Executive Jet’s substantial relationship principle has played a prominent role
in this paper’s inquiry. It is fitting, therefore, to conclude by asking how criticisms of
the principle overall231 measure up against the test’s use in the Macondo setting.
The conclusion here is that it holds up admirably if Grubart’s qualification is
respected that the “test turns on the comparison of traditional maritime activity to
the arguably maritime character of the tortfeasor’s activity in a given case….”232 An
examination of the criticisms reflects that applying the test in Macondo’s tightly
framed OCS “operations” setting either avoids the problems that more open-ended
settings are claimed to present, or generates benefits that outweigh the costs of
abandoning the former brightline location rule.
The criticisms selected are represented by the overlapping concerns voiced
by Judge Posner in Tagliere v. Harrah’s Illinois Corporation,233 Justice Scalia in Sisson
v. Ruby234 and Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, in Grubart.235 Four in number,
the first asserts that the loss is indefensible because the test is likely to be required
only for “rare freakish cases.”236 In characteristically colorful phrasemaking, Justice
Scalia speaks of torts that fail the test as “exotic actions [that] appear more
frequently in the theoretical musings of the ‘thoroughbred admiralty men’… than in
the federal reports.”237
To describe the Macondo blowout as a “rare freakish event,” however, would
be perverse. The President’s Commission reports that from 1996 to 2009 in the
United States Gulf of Mexico alone there were 79 reported cases of loss of well
control accidents, which occur when hydrocarbons flow uncontrolled either
underground or at the surface.238 It is true that litigated OCS oil well blowouts have
See authorities cited supra note 65.
Grubart at 542.
233 445 F.3rd 1013 (7th Cir. 2006).
234 497 U.S. 358, 368 (1990( Scalia, J., concurring).
235 Grubart at 549 (Thomas J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring).
236 Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. at 358 (1990) (Scalia, J.). See also Grubart at 555
(‘freakish cases, Thomas J.); Tagliere at 1014 (7th Cir. 2006 ) (“freak cases,” Posner,
J.).
237 Sisson, 497 U.S. at 374.
238 See President’s Report at p. 226-29 for a tabular listing of each event. The report
recounts the general history of 20th Century American oil spills, well blowouts, and
231
232
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been rare, but they are hardly “freakish.” On the contrary, the risk of the devastating
consequences that have become a reality throughout the Gulf following the Macondo
blowout has been the subject of decades of sustained, apprehensive Congressional
attention. Uncertainty whether, where and when there will be another Macondotype blowout must be measured against the frightening magnitude of a multimillion barrel event. Unfortunately it is a risk that will only increase as future wells
are drilled even deeper, further out to sea, and in less hospitable environments than
the Gulf.239
The second objection relates to who will make the call on the test. The matter
would not be controversial at all if the task were assigned to Congress. Justice
Thomas, for example, would not likely complain as he did in Grubart that leaving the
matter to judges “may permit judicial power to reach beyond its constitutional and
statutory limits, or … discourage judges from hearing disputes properly before
them.”240 Whether or not this criticism is persuasive in non-OCS contexts, however,
it is of little consequence in the Macondo OCSLA setting where the framework for a
disciplined evaluation of the call has already engaged Congress at the deepest policy
and substantive level. Congress and a score of technically proficient federal
agencies have spent decades defining policies and practices for management and
governance of OCS oil drilling operations. The courts, therefore, enjoy guidance that
is as well-framed for pronouncing on the question in this “given case” as they enjoy
in other spheres featuring similar Congressional policy review and draftsmanship
and federal agency rulemaking.
This conclusion is not undermined by the turbulence in Fifth Circuit OCS
decisions noted both within the Circuit 241 and in commentary.242 The disorder is
more likely a result of the Circuit’s self-acknowledged disinclination243 to honor the
guidance afforded by OCSLA’s legislative history as amplified in the pertinent
Supreme Court opinions. The problem, in short, does not lie with the substantial
relationship test, which, in the OCS drilling context, functions as a restraint upon,
not an enabler of unduly expansive admiralty jurisdiction.
the disruptive effects of hurricanes and other natural disasters on platform
construction and drilling in Chapters 2-6.
239 See id. at 294.
240 Grubart at 549.
241 Illustrative is the plaint of one Fifth Circuit judge addressing a 43 U.S.C. sec.
1333(a)(2)(A) (2006) problem: “In each new case, a panel of this court must comb
through a bewildering array of cases that rely upon inconsistent reasoning in the
hope of finding an identical fact situation. Absent en banc reconciliation, cases thus
are decided on what seems to be a random factual basis.” Smith v. Penrod Drilling
Corp., 960 F. 2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1992) overruled on other grounds, Grand Isle
Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC, 589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir. 2009).
242 For an exhaustive collection of widely divergent Fifth Circuit cases in what
Professor Robertson terms this “infamously chaotic” sphere, see Mistakes at 480.
243 See supra note 47.
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Closely related to the second question is the third: whether judges will be
able to fashion rules for the substantial relationship test without increasing
“complication and uncertainty,244 introducing “disruption and confusion,”245 or
rendering the jurisdiction determination “hopelessly uncertain.”246 Staying focused
on the “given case,” the same considerations that overcame the preceding objection
apply forcefully to this one as well. Congress has already defined criteria pursuant to
which jurisdictional lines should be drawn respecting OCS “operations.”247 The
judiciary’s role, therefore, is closely tethered to and necessarily conducted within a
framework precisely delineated by these criteria.
The final objection achieves crisp statement in Judge Posner’s dictate that
“the most important requirement of a jurisdictional rule is not that it appeals to
common sense but that it be clear.”248 He proposes as an alternative basis the
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act,249 which establishes admiralty jurisdiction
independent of the “substantial relationship” requirement. He acknowledges,
however, his position’s conflict with the Act’s legislative history, the contrary
decisions of other circuits, and the Supreme Court’s refusal to rule one way or the
other on the question. Nonetheless, he continued
[w]e do not think that the [Act’s] legislative history should override (its]
broad statutory language, which provides a clear and simple jurisdictional
test for cases like this in contrast to the vague ‘maritime nexus’ (or
‘connection’) test … that is used to determine jurisdiction under section
1333(1)….”250
The persuasiveness of Judge Posner’s reasoning is contingent upon the
context in which it, along with the arguments of Justices Scalia and Thomas, is
offered: namely, a clash between the competing claims for jurisdiction and law
selection in which the candidates are general maritime or admiralty law and state
law. But Macondo’s context opposes federal non-admiralty statutory law to judgemade general maritime law. Delaval counsels that the presence of a federal statute
resets the question.251 Consequently, Judge Posner’s cost/benefit analysis –clarity
over common sense to avoid replacing simplicity with complexity in determining
jurisdiction- must be revised to take into account other variables introduced by
OCSLA and OPA, the Macondo context’s federal statutes.
Sisson, 497 U.S. at 387 (Scalia, J.).
Grubart at 1015 (Thomas J.)
246 Tagliere, 445 F. 3rd at 1015 (Posner, J).
247 OCSLA sec. 1349(b)(1). See TAN 223-24 supra.
248 Tagliere, 445 F.3rd at 1013.
24946 U.S.C. sec. 30101 (2006).
250 Tagliere, 445 F.3rd at 1014.
251 See TAN 53 supra.
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A shift to the Macondo context brings to light a variety of costs avoided by
the substantial relationship inquiry that are incurred by choosing “clarity” over
“common sense.” Most have already been addressed in this paper, starting with
dishonoring the Congressional intent reflected in OCSLA ‘53’s legislative history as
further elaborated in pertinent Supreme Court opinions. But others merit attention
as well. Unduly broad assertions of admiralty jurisdiction cost the states their
opportunity to participate in matters peripheral to admiralty’s central concerns.
Since admiralty jurisdiction in the general maritime law vs. state law contests
typically begets the application of substantive admiralty law, these claims frustrate
Congress’s recognition that OCSLA platform workers’ social welfare needs are best
secured by OCSLA-endorsed state law under section 1333(a)(2)(A).
Within Macondo’s context, moreover, Judge Posner’s clarity is achieved not
by the application of Occam’s razor –the excision of spurious or redundant claims-but by expunging vital elements demanded for the inquiry’s rational pursuit. One
such element evident throughout this paper is zeroing out OCSLA/OPA’s
environmental values as indispensable components of any analysis of Macondo’s
jurisdictional basis, while isolating the “vessel” question as though its outcome has
nothing to do with these values or their means of implementation. Another is the
opportunity to address the fundamental issue of rationality that Executive Jet boldly
and properly sets forth: what are the components of a proper fit between a dispute’s
content and the appropriateness of its resolution under admiralty rules and
procedures?
A difficult question to be sure, and one whose response must be acutely
sensitive to the dispute’s context. But it needs to be asked if the venture is to claim
any pretense of rationality. When pursued in the Macondo context, the following
questions present themselves:
Is it rational to assimilate the Deepwater Horizon MODU to a general
maritime law “vessel” in light of the astonishing technological transformation of oil
drilling technology and infrastructure that has radically increased the risk of these
disasters in just the last 30 years?252
Is it rational to apply judge-made maritime tort rules to govern the Macondo
blowout in view of the conflicting values and constituencies that shaped these rules,
on the one side, and OCSLA ’78 and OPA, on the other?253
See President’s Commission at 32-53. As only one example of infrastructure
innovation, the Report features a mock-up of Shell Oil’s Auger fixed oilfield platform
that, in spatial scope, dwarfs New Orleans entire central business district, the
contiguous Mississippi River and the adjoining West Bank. Id. at 39.
253 The differences reflect a shift from the 18th and 19th century’s dominance of the
values of shippers and insurers abetted by the nation’s desire to nurture its
maritime commerce to the last-third of the 20th century’s embrace of environmental
values that forced the radical accommodations found in OCSLA ’78 and OPA.
252
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Is it rational to assume that judges can or should seek to cope with the
complexity and pace of technological, economic and attitudinal changes documented
in this paper through general maritime law rule-making, when Congress and scores
of federal agencies have had continuously to revise their posture toward the
pollution and environmental consequences of OCS drilling operations, and appear
poised to do so for the fourth time in a half century?
Is it rational to assume that admiralty law --a “very limited body of customs
and ordinances of the sea,” according to Justice Holmes”254-- ever possessed or
possesses now the jurisprudential genes required to achieve the necessary fit with
the complex demands of OCS governance?255
Finally, is it rational to assume that if these questions are approached from
an admiraltycentric perspective, they will yield to any other than an
admiraltycentric response?256
Illustrative are the latters’ broader liability rules, lesser liability limitations, and
broader categories of aggrieved parties and damages (e.g., economic loss
disassociated from owner property damage, environmental resource damages,
streamlined damaged claim procedures, new classes of third-party plaintiffs, and
expanded insurer exposure). For a detailed account of these shifts, see Lawrence
Kiern, supra note 61.
254 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 235 (1917) (Holmes J., dissenting).
255 Pertinent to a response is Justice Marshall’s statement’s that “the demand for tidy
rules can go too far, and when that demand entirely divorces the jurisdictional
inquiry from the purposes that support the exercise of jurisdiction, it has gone too
far.” Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. at 364, n. 2.
256 This paper has evaluated its principal issues and themes as an exercise in legal
method, constitutional and statutory interpretation and jurisprudence derived from
pertinent federal legislation and Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court decisions. An
equally cogent approach might evaluate admiralty’s claim for jurisdictional priority
over OCS operations as a struggle for institutional primacy that calls to mind
England’s brass-knuckle, centuries-long warfare between common law and equity
or, indeed, common law and admiralty. For the latter, see David Robertson,
Admiralty and Federalism 43-64 (1970). It is no denigration of legal process to
suggest that extra-legal competitive dynamics may have something to do with the
following outcomes, among others, considered in this paper: the Fifth Circuit’s
treatment of personal injury torts atop drilling platforms as admiralty torts for 16
years following the enactment of OCSLA ’53 on the basis of a construction of the Act
in Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F. 2d 60 (5th Cir. 1961) that utterly ignores its legislative
history; the neutering of OCSLA post-Rodrigue; the reluctance to concede law
selection, law application or substantive force to OCSLA section 1333(a)(1) prior to
or following OCSLA ’78; the pre-Herb’s Welding inclusion of OCS drilling operations
as LHWCA “maritime commerce”; or Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine LLC,
589 F. 3rd 778 (5th Cir. 2009), which, in overruling decisions that select and apply
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ADDENDUM: B-1 Bundle Rulings
Immediately prior to the submission of this paper for publication, Judge
Barbier handed down an “Order and Reasons” concerning the Macondo MDL
Plaintiffs’ “B-1” Master Complaint, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, and the
Plaintiffs’ Oppositions.257 The B-1 “Bundle” includes various categories of plaintiffs
pressing over 100,000 individual claims of diverse forms of economic loss damages
under general maritime law, OPA, and various state laws. The rulings hue to the
admiraltycentric outcomes driven by the Fifth Circuit model,258 a result at the trial
level that does not surprise given the force of the appellant precedents binding upon
the District Court. With the Transocean Concursus action already set as the first of
the MDL actions, 259 moreover, a ruling denying the Macondo’s status as an
admiralty tort was unlikely, as earlier intimated.260
Limitations of space and time preclude attention to reviewing the full battery
of the court’s rulings or to detailed consideration of the two that are addressed here.
The first declares that the Deepwater Horizon is a “vessel,” “as that term is defined
and understood in general maritime law.”261 The second, that the Macondo OCS
operation satisfies the Executive Jet/Grubart “substantially related to a traditional
maritime activity” requirement.262 Only summary discussion of these two rulings is
called for in any event because both were anticipated and their pros and cons
precisely detailed in the paper’s body.
The court’s first ruling proceeds from two deficient premises. One is that the
concept of a “vessel” is generic throughout admiralty law rather than a creature of
the particular governing statute in question, if such there be, that includes or
excludes watercraft on the basis of stated criteria. OCSLA, of course, fulfills this role,
along with OPA, in the Macondo setting. Despite the OCSLA/OPA combine, the B1
Bundle ruling draws randomly from and treats generically the status of specialized
tort “law of the locus” rather than contract “focus of the contract” principles to
indemnity actions arising from tortious personal injuries, increases the likelihood
that admiralty law will be preferred over OCSLA-endorsed state law in these
contests. If the Supreme Court’s declaration is taken seriously that OCSLA
incorporates Congress’s intent that “admiralty treatment [be] eschewed altogether,”
Rodrigue at 365 n.12, Executive Jet does valuable service in requiring that the issues
posed in this paper, no less than OCSLA itself, be taken seriously as well.
257 In re: Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20,
2010, MDL No. 2179, Case 2:10-md-02179-CJB-SS Doc. 3830 (E.D. La. 2011)
[hereinafter B1 Bundle].
258 This model is outlined supra Part I.B.1.
259 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
260 See infra TAN 14.
261 B1 Bundle at 4.
262 B1 Bundle at 8.
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watercraft in Jones Act,263 LHWCA264 and OCS265 settings. OCSLA’s legislative
history, text amendments, and interpretation by federal agencies demand a
different approach as amply detailed in Part III B.1 of this paper. Contrary to the
ruling, they demonstrate the necessity for the precise attention to context superbly
exemplified by Judge Politz’s warning in Houston Oil & Minerals Corporation v.
American International Tool Company, that “[w]e are not convinced that the term
“vessel” for Jones Act purposes, which is subject to liberal construction consistent
with the purposes of the Act, is necessarily a vessel for other purposes as well….”266
The ruling’s second ground is that mobility lies at the root of the generic
“vessel” concept. To hold that a mobile platform is not a “vessel,” the court states,
runs “counter to longstanding case law which establishes conclusively that the
Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling unit, was a vessel.”267 Combining
this premise with the generic concept position, the court’s recourse to Dutra is
inevitable in light of Dutra’s description of a “vessel” as “any watercraft practically
capable of maritime transportation, regardless of its primary purpose or state of
transit at a particular moment.” 268 Ignored are that Dutra is a non-OCS location case
involving a non-OCS “operation,” as defined in OCSLA sec. 1333(a)(1). Hence, Dutra’s
source for application of the “vessel” concept is general maritime law, not OCSLA
sec. 1333(a)(1) and the OPA provisions outlined earlier.269 While the Deepwater
Horizon’s mobility does indeed constitute it a MODU, moreover, the latter term is
but a first step in the complex process described in Part IV.A. of determining
whether the rig also qualifies as an OPA sec. 2701(37) “vessel,” a process the ruling
ignores.
The court’s ruling that the Macondo operation is substantially related to a
traditional maritime activity disposes of this complex issue in a single conclusory
sentence,270 buttressed by a citation to the Fifth Circuit’s Theriot v. Drilling Bay
Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir. 1959).
Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., 543 U.S. 481 (2005).
265 Demette v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc. 280 F.3rd 492 (5th Cir. 2002), overruled in part
on other grounds by Grand Isle Shipyard, Inc. v. Seacor Marine, LLC, 589 F.3rd 778 (5th
Cir. 2009) (en banc).
266 827 F.2d 1049, 1053 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, AMF Tuboscope, Inc. v. Houston
Oil & Minerals Corp., 484 U.S. 1067 (1988). Houston Oil was a negligence and
products liability action arising from the malfunction of a mud saver sub aboard an
OCS mobile drilling rig. Among other cases cited by the court for its holding that
OCSLA-endorsed state law applied are Executive Jet, id. at 1053; Foremost Ins. Co. v.
Richardson, 457 U.S. 688 (1982); Herb’s Welding, 470 U.S. 414 (1986); and Sohyde
Drilling Co. v. Coastal Gas Prod. Co., 644 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1981).
267 B1 Bundle at 5 (boldface as quoted).
268 Stewart v. Dutra Constr. Co., Inc., 543 U.S. 481, 497 (2009).
269 See supra Part IV.A.
270 The sentence, as it appears in in B1 Bundle at 8 declares: “Second, the operations
of the DEEPWATER HORIZON bore a substantial relationship to traditional
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Drilling Corporation decision.271 As a nisi prius court the Eastern District of Louisiana
is accountable, of course, to and properly must take into account Fifth Circuit
precedents. Despite the Fifth Circuit’s ample delineation of admiralty jurisdiction’s
bounds,272 however, Theriot‘s citation as the authoritative precedent is ill-chosen
even within the Circuit’s jurisprudence. Theriot’s oil drilling operation occurred in
Galveston Bay, not on the OCS,273 and addressed a contract, not a tort issue.274 As a
non-OCS event, of course, the operation is not subject to OCSLA’s coverage as
detailed in Part II. C.-E., nor to the considerations bearing upon its status under
Executive Jet/Grubart detailed in in Part IV.B. Framing a dispute as a contract rather
than a tort action, moreover, biases the outcome in favor of admiralty jurisdiction.275
Finally, predicating the ruling’s result on Theriot conflates Executive Jet/Grubart’s
test’s location requirement with its separate requirement calling for an independent
analysis of the underlying activity giving rise to the alleged admiralty tort.276
The question whether the Macondo blowout is an admiralty tort taps deeply
into the decades-long tension between the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court over
OCSLA’s scope. The ultimate venue for its definitive resolution properly lies
elsewhere than in the District Court, whichever outcome the latter might have
preferred. Whether or not the Macondo MDL action will afford the occasion for the
issue’s denoument remains to be seen.

maritime activity. See Theriot v. Bay Drilling Corporation, 783 F.2d 527, 538-39 (5th
Cir. 1986) (“oil and gas drilling on navigable waters aboard a vessel is recognized to
be maritime commerce”).”
271 738 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1986)
272 See examples cited supra note 256 supra.
273 Id. at 530.
274 Theriot addressed an indemnity contract for injuries incurred by the employees
of their respective contractors. Id. at 538-40.
275 See supra note 41. Theriot demonstrates as much in its declaration that
“[w]hether a particular contract can be characterized as maritime depends on the
nature and character of the contract, not on the situs of its performance and
execution.” Id. at 538.
276 See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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